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I

Eradicatingdiscrimination is a lofty goal, arid since the second half of
the twentieth century, the United States has largely relied upon the legal
system to achieve this goal. Yet a great deal of scholarship suggests that
the legal system may not always do a credible job. Scholars have
documented multiple instances of discrimination laws' inaccessibility to
discrimination victims individually and inability to improve the labor
market prospects of victims as a whole. Still missing from the literature,
however, is an assessment of what separates effective discriminationlaws
from ineffective ones. This Article fills this gap, using both qualitative and
quantitative methods to determine the types of enforcement mechanisms
that successfully and systematically improve the labor market outcomes of
individuals protected by discrimination laws. The Article takes advantage
of jurisdictionalvariation in laws that prohibit weight-based employment
discrimination, which create a naturalexperimentfor testing what types of
laws and what types of remedies lead to meaningful improvement in the
employment outcomes of protected workers. Applying the lessons learned
from the weight-discriminationcontext to employment discriminationlaw
more generally, the Article concludes that the existence of civil rights
legislation on the books does little good for a protected class if a
jurisdictionfails to allocate resources to enforcement appropriately. The
study provides a cautionary tale for advocacy groups that focus all their
resourceson lobbyingfor new civil rightsprotections; theirpurposes might
be better served by devoting significant resources to facilitating
representation and raising public awareness about existing civil rights
laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vindicating civil rights sounds good in theory, but is the law any good
at it? Scholars, attorneys, and members of the public all complain about the
increasing difficulty of bringing, let alone winning, a discrimination
lawsuit.' The complaints often center on a common theme-namely, that

1. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Job-DiscriminationCases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl23500883048618747; Steve Vogel,
EEOC Struggles with Huge Workload, Diminished Staff WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2009),
Even
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/AR2009020202452.htm.
U.S. senators have complained recently about the difficulties that employment discrimination plaintiffs
currently face in bringing an employment discrimination case. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Alexander Calls on EEOC Nominees to Say How They Would
Address EEOC Practices that "Cost Taxpayers, Hurt Victims of Workplace Discrimination" (Nov. 13,
http://www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/alexander-calls-on-ecoc-nominees-to-say2014),
how-they-would-address-eeoc-practices-that-cost-taxpayers-hurt-victims-of-workplace-discrimination.

52

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 68:1:49

the processes and procedures associated with enforcing these claims have
become too costly, too time-consuming, and too complicated to be
practicable. For plaintiffs, the frustrations often begin at the charge-filing
stage. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
federal agency in charge of administering employment discrimination
charges, is notoriously underfunded, resulting in a backlog of cases, long
wait times for charge investigation, and fewer resources for the agency to
litigate claims in the public interest.2 The obstacles become still more
cumbersome if a plaintiff makes it through the charge-filing phase to the
litigation phase. Complex, unforgiving proof structures render these cases
virtually impossible to pursue without an attorney.3 Even with the
assistance of an attorney and a meritorious underlying claim, plaintiffs face
increasingly hostile courts and evidentiary burdens that some worthy
plaintiffs will never be able to satisfy.4 All of these developments have

worked to raise the personal and financial costs associated with bringing a
discrimination lawsuit,5 which has led to an overall decline in the number

of such lawsuits filed at the federal level in recent years.6
2. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 34 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 424, 445-46 (2015) (discussing how the underfunding of
the EEOC has led to a precipitous decline in public interest lawsuits filed by the agency in recent
years); Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and PracticeImperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.

219 (1995) (arguing that the EEOC should cease processing discrimination charges because it is so
overwhelmed with them due to lack of resources); see also Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New
Paradigmfor EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory

Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 347 (2000) (arguing that the "EEOC has been so underfunded and
so understaffed for such a long time that you can't fault them for the [backlog] situation anymore"

(alteration in original) (quoting Darryl Van Dutch, Paralysisfor EEOC Feared, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24,
1998, at Al)).
3.
Accord Laura Beth Nielsen, et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment DiscriminationLitigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL

STuD. 175, 188 (2010) ("[P]ro se [plaintiffs] ... are almost three times more likely to have their cases
dismissed, are less likely to gain early settlement, and are twice as likely to lose on summary
judgment.").

4.

See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011)

(arguing that courts' requirements that discrimination plaintiffs identify a similarly situated comparator

prevents many employees with legitimate claims, particularly employees with unique job titles, from
succeeding).
5.

See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Standing in the Gap: A Profile ofEmployment Discrimination

Plaintiffs, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 431, 434 (2006) (pointing out the heavy toll that
employment discrimination suits take on plaintiffs). According to one plaintiff, "If you ever go into a
lawsuit because you think it's about money, you won't last a week.... It has to be that you are so

passionately moved by what you believe . .. [F]or me, I knew, win or lose, [this lawsuit's] gonna cost
me my career." Id. (second alteration in original).

6.

See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in

Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103 (2009) [hereinafter From Bad to

Worse] (demonstrating empirically that employment discrimination lawsuit filings declined between
2002 and 2007); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. .429 (2004) (expressing concern that

employment discrimination plaintiffs (and their attorneys) are becoming frustrated by low rates of
success in federal court).
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. At the same time, the legal scholarship largely maintains that
discrimination laws have played some role, at least historically, in the
advancement of civil rights.7 A recent review of empirical evidence on the
labor market effects of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for instance,
concluded that in spite of its failure to achieve complete workplace
equality, the Act "changed the legal norm from one of exclusivity to one of
inclusivity" by "fundamentally alter[ing] the at-will employment scheme
that otherwise governed the U.S. labor market." 8 Still missing from the
literature, however, is a systematic investigation of the types of
administrative and enforcement practices that have led to the most
meaningful changes in the lives of discrimination laws' intended
beneficiaries. Current scholarship leaves much reason for advocates and
policymakers to be concerned about drafting a civil rights law that sounds
good in name, but does nothing in practice 9 -or even worse, drafting a
civil rights law that has unexpected, negative consequences on its intended
beneficiaries.10 Yet the scholarship leaves advocates and policymakers

7.

See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986) (arguing

that Title VII is efficient under neoclassical economic theory, and noting that the Act "stands as the
most visible legislative'pronouncement of this country's commitment to equal opportunity for all
Americans"); Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights. Congress, Courts, and the 1964 Civil Rights

Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 945, 946 (2005) (arguing that the 1964 Civil Rights Act created "'Rights of
Belonging,' [or] those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community
and that facilitate equal membership in that community"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 10 (1992) (arguing for the repeal

of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, although admitting, "knowing what I know today, if given an all-ornothing choice, I should still have voted in favor of the Civil Rights Act in order to allow federal power
to break the stranglehold of local government on race relations").

8.

Hersch & Shinall, supra note 2, at 450.

9.

See, e.g., Jennifer Bennett Shinall, What Happens When the Definition ofDisability Changes?

The Case of Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON. 1 (2016) (finding no employment effects of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act on newly protected workers); see also Tracey E. George et al.,
The New Old Legal Realism, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 689 (2011). In the George et al. study, a team of legal
researchers interviewed Las Vegas casino employees about the impact of a well-known Title VII

decision, Jespersen v. Harrah'sOperating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106-17 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), on
their job's grooming requirements. In Jespersen, a casino bartender in Reno challenged her former
employer's sex-based grooming standards under Title VII, and in response to her claim, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion seemed to open the door to challenging workplace grooming requirements under Title
VII. In spite of the decision's widespread media coverage, the authors found that the casino workers,
who stood to gain the most from the decision, were completely unaware of it. And when the authors
made them aware of the favorable legal decision, the casino workers expressed unwillingness to come
forward and enforce their newfound rights.
10. For example, a series of empirical studies conducted by economists have found that labor
market outcomes of disabled individuals have, at best, stayed the same and, at worst, declined, since the

passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist,
Consequences ofEmployment Protection? The Case ofthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL.

ECON. 915, 915-57 (2001) (finding a negative effect); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment
Effects of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693 (2000) (finding a negative
effect); Julie L. Hotchkiss, A CloserLook at the Employment Impact of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 887 (2004) (finding no effect); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment
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bereft of guidance on how to craft a discrimination law that actually works.
Investigating the mechanisms behind an effective civil rights law becomes
particularly critical in the wake of calls for new civil rights laws,
particularly from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community.1
The investigation of how laws work and whether they function in their
intended manner has formed the basis of the law-in-action movement.12
One method of determining how law works in action is to conduct
qualitative research, interviewing actors on the ground to ask their opinion
of how the law works. 13 Although qualitative research can provide
remarkable insight into the motivations of relevant actors, concerns about
sample selection bias 1 4 are difficult to overcome in the absence of empirical
proof that the interviewed population is sufficiently representative of the
relevant population as a whole." Perhaps a more systematic way of
evaluating how a law works in action is to study the law's effects
quantitatively. An obvious way to evaluate a law's efficacy in the
employment discrimination context is to compare labor market data (such
as wages and employment) before and after a law's enactment in order to
determine whether conditions have improved for the newly protected
ofPeople with DisabilitiesFollowing the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31 (2003) (suggesting that a finding of
no effect or of a negative effect depends upon the underlying assumptions in analyzing the data).
11. At the federal level, LGBT advocates have successfully convinced members of Congress to
consider a bill that explicitly provides employment protections to the LGBT community, known as the

Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), in virtually every session of Congress since the mid1990s. See Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, CTR. FOR AM.

PROGRESS (July 19, 2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/gbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/ahistory-of-the-employment-non-discrimination-act/ (detailing the history of the various attempts to pass

ENDA since 1994). But see Tierney Sneed, Why LGBT Groups Turned on ENDA, U.S. NEWS (July 9,
2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/why-lgbt-groups-turned-on-enda

(discussing

some LGBT movement members' concerns about the religious exemption in the latest version of
proposed ENDA legislation). The bill has never simultaneously passed both houses. See id (describing
how two different versions of the bill have passed the House and the Senate, but during two different

sessions of Congress).
12. For examples of law-in-action scholarship, see Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and
the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 275 (2001); Stewart Macaulay, The

New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used To Be," 2005 Wis. L. REv. 365
(2005); Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters: An Organizational
Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer Lemon Laws, 46 LAW. & Soc'Y REV. 463

(2012).
13.
14.

See, e.g., George et al., supranote 9.
Sample selection bias occurs whenever a sample is drawn non-randomly from the population

intended to be studied. For a discussion of the biases that result from sample selection bias, and an
econometric correction for such bias, see James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error,47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979).

15.

"Sample selection bias can have various effects. It can create a false appearance of

discrimination, or it can change the apparent magnitude of a real discriminatory practice,... [or it] may

conceal, or partially conceal, discrimination . . . ." Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of
Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN.

L. REV. 27, 47 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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group. Many economists have conducted precisely such research.1 6 The
downside, of course, of empirical studies is that, while they can provide a
more complete picture about whether a law is working, they generally
cannot say much (other than guess) about why a law is working.
Hence, the best approach to evaluating what types of employment
discrimination laws work-and why they work-is to use both qualitative
and quantitative methods, which is precisely the aim of this Article. To
conduct such a study requires identifying a group that is protected by law in
some jurisdictions, but not all jurisdictions, so that there exists variation.
This variation will allow comparison between labor market outcomes of the
group in protecting jurisdictions and non-protecting jurisdictions. As a
result, none of the federally protected classes (e.g., race, sex, disability) are
good candidates for study since all U.S. jurisdictions prohibit this type of
discrimination. From a qualitative perspective, protected classes that are
good candidates for study will also be protected by laws with jurisdictional
variation in enforcement mechanisms. If the labor market data indicate that
one jurisdiction's law works better than another jurisdiction's law,
differences in enforcement mechanisms between the jurisdictions may be
able to explain why one jurisdiction has better results.
With the federally protected classes ruled out, the next step becomes
identifying another group that is protected in some U.S. jurisdictions, but
not all. To be a good candidate for study, the sometimes-protected class (1)
must have the variation in legal coverage described above, and (2) must
also be identifiable in labor market data. One obvious candidate for
evaluation is the effect of LGBT discrimination laws on members of the
LGBT community. Although there exists substantial variation across U.S.
jurisdictions regarding whether members of the LGBT community are
legally protected from employment discrimination,' 7 identification is what
makes the empirical study of LGBT employment laws difficult. Labor
market datasets do not generally collect information on respondents' sexual
orientation or gender identity.' 8 Consequently, from an empirical

16.

See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 10 (evaluating the labor market effects of the

Americans with Disabilities Act empirically); Kenneth Y. Chay, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights
Policy on Black Economic Progress:Evidencefrom the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of]972, 51

INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 608 (1998) (evaluating the labor market effects of Title VII empirically);
DeLeire, supra note 10 (evaluating the labor market effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act
empirically); Joanne Song, FallingBetween the Cracks: DiscriminationLaws and Older Women (Dec.

2012), http://paa2013.princeton.edulpapers/130235

(evaluating the labor market effects of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act empirically).

17.

For an updated list of the states that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
-

sexual orientation and/or gender identity, see Non-DiscriminationLaws: State-by-State Information
Map, AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-

information-map [hereinafterNon-DiscriminationLaws Map] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
18. For a discussion of the difficulties of studying the labor market outcomes of the LGBT
community-given the imperfect (at best) measures of sexual orientation and gender identity in existing

[Vol. 68:1:49
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standpoint, it becomes impossible to tell whether wage and employment
outcomes improve for individuals who identify as LGBT after a
jurisdiction passes a protective law.
Fortunately, another sometimes-protected group exists that meets both
the criteria above: obese individuals. Obese individuals are identifiable in a
handful of labor-market datasets that collect information on respondents'
body mass index (BMI).1 9 Moreover, ten jurisdictions across the United
States prohibit employment discrimination against obese individuals
through bans on weight and/or personal appearance discrimination. The
jurisdictions include the state of Michigan; the Maryland counties of
Harford, Howard, and Prince George; and the cities of Madison,
Wisconsin; Washington, District of Columbia; Urbana, Illinois; Santa Cruz,
California; San Francisco, California; and Binghamton, New York. In of all
these places, laws protect weight (or personal appearance generally) in the
same manner that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects race, sex, color,
religion, and national origin.20
Together, the laws present a unique opportunity to conduct a natural
experiment. 2 1 This natural experiment can address questions that lack of
jurisdictional variation and lack of data have previously impeded
researchers' ability to answer-questions such as, what types of
employment discrimination remedies best equalize the playing field for
underserved groups in the labor market? What kinds of enforcement
practices discourage plaintiffs from coming forward and pursuing
meritorious claims? And how legitimate is the concern that workers do not
know their legal rights? To provide insight into these questions, this Article
will first use the ten weight/personal appearance laws to investigate
quantitatively which (if any) of these laws have led to meaningful
improvement in labor market outcomes of obese individuals.

datasets-see Christopher S. Carpenter, Self-Reported Sexual Orientationand Earnings: Evidencefrom

Cahfornia,58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 258, 258-73 (2005).
19. Throughout this Article, weight categories are defined according to body mass index (BMI),
which is calculated using the following equation: BM= weight(lb) x 703 . Using BMI, individuals are
(height(in))2
then classified as underweight if their BMI is less than 18.5, normal weight if their BMI is greater than
or equal to 18.5 but less than 25.0, overweight if their BMI is greater than or equal to 25.0 but less than
30.0, obese if their BMI is greater than or equal to 30.0 but less than 40.0, and morbidly obese if their
BMI

is

greater

than

or

equal

to

40.0.

See

Obesity:

Symptoms,

MAYO

CLINIC,

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/obesity/basics/symptoms/con-20014834
(last visited
Sept. 12, 2016).
20. See infra Part III.
21. A natural experiment is a term used by social scientists to describe "a wide variety of studies
that resemble . .. randomized field experiments . . . but that lack the researcher control or random
assignment characteristic of a true experiment." See DAHLIA K. REMLER & GREGG G. VAN RYZIN,
RESEARCH METHODS IN PRACTICE: STRATEGIES FOR DESCRIPTION AND CAUSATION 428 (2011).
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With these quantitative results in mind, the Article will then rely on
both personal interviews and historical archive work to investigate
qualitatively the differences in legislative purpose, administration, and
enforcement between the effective and ineffective laws. The study will
conclude that the laws with the quickest and cheapest enforcement
mechanisms, not coincidentally, are also the ones that have been most
effective in improving labor market outcomes. Of particular importance to
effective enforcement of civil rights are mandatory mediation requirements,
swift adjudication timelines, accommodation of pro se plaintiffs, and
promotion of public awareness.
In conducting this quantitative and qualitative investigation, the study
will proceed 'as follows: Part II discusses prior scholarly critiques of the
enforcement design of employment discrimination laws and then explores
the institutional and procedural design mechanisms that might improve
current laws. Part IHI introduces the arguments as to why obese individuals
may require additional labor market protections and then details the ten
local protections that currently exist. The Part next describes the empirical
techniques and data necessary to test the efficacy of the laws as well as the
results of the empirical analysis. Part IV discusses the differences in
enforcement mechanisms that make some weight-discrimination laws more
successful than others, and Part V discusses the implications of this study
for employment discrimination laws more generally.
II. DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS

A. Failuresof the CurrentDesign
Employment discrimination scholars have repeatedly lamented the
inability of current laws, particularly at the federal level, to rid the
workplace of discrimination. Undoubtedly, the relative position of
minorities and women in the labor market has improved over the halfcentury that has passed since the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 2 2 Yet neither group
has fully escaped their historical disadvantage; even after adjusting for
differences in other observables like education and working hours, white
women continue to earn about 10% less than white men,23 while African-

22. See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 2, at 439-50 (concluding from the available empirical
evidence that neither women nor minorities have caught up to men in the workplace, although these
historically underserved groups have made significant progress since the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act).
23. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Gender Wage DisparitiesAmong the Highly Educated, 43 J.
HuM. RESOURCES 630, 652 (2008) (estimating that white women earn approximately ninety-one cents
for every dollar that a white man earns).
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American men continue to earn about 15% less.24 Blame for the persistence
of discrimination in the workplace-in spite of legal protection-has taken
a number of forms, with scholars citing everything from social causes (such
as minorities' continued poor access to quality education 25 or women's
continued role as the primary family caretakers 26) to legal causes (such as
the judicially created proof structures in federal discrimination caseS 2 7 ).
Although prior scholars have identified a number of problems with
employment discrimination law, a significant number of these issues fall
under the category of administration and enforcement.
The agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the
federal law has been the subject of particular scrutiny by legal scholars. As
discussed in the Introduction, some of the concerns raised regarding the
EEOC are practical in nature. Current law requires all Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act plaintiffs to file a charge with the agency,
which has, not surprisingly, led to bottlenecks in agency investigations.28
Given the widely recognized shortage of agency funding 29-and the
improbability of Congress significantly increasing agency funding 3 0
practical critiques have focused on how the agency may best utilize its
scarce resources. For instance, Michael Z. Green has suggested that the
agency move from an optional mediation model to a mandatory mediation

24. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Why Do Minority Men Earn Less? A Study of Wage
DiferentialsAmong the Highly Educated, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300, 306 (2006) (estimating that
African-American men earn approximately eighty-three to eighty-seven cents for every dollar that a
white man eams).

25.

See generally id. (discussing the difficulties in adequately controlling for education in

estimating the minority-white wage gap, given the known persistence of differences in education

quality).
26.
See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something To Talk About: Information
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing that women
continue to bear the primary burden of caretaking responsibilities at home).

27.

One of the most frequently noted points of failure in employment discrimination adjudication

is the judicially created proof structure that encourages (and in some federal circuits, requires) indirect
proof of discrimination through the use of similarly situated comparators. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra
note 4; Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment

DiscriminationLaw, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831 (2002); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash:
ProvingDiscriminationby Comparators,60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009).

28.

According to one district office director, EEOC charge investigations regularly exceed a

year. See Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, Dist. Dir. of Memphis Office, Equal Emp't

Opportunity Comm'n (Jan. 9, 2012); see also Munroe, supra note 2, at 260-61(discussing how the
agency has always had a "backlog" of cases).
29. Indeed, lack of funding has been an issue for the agency since its beginnings. See DESMOND
S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND POLITICS IN OBAMA'S AMERICA

104 (2011) (discussing the effects of agency underfunding as early as the 1970s).
30.

See, e.g., Green, supranote 2, at 349 (describing Republicans' concern that the agency is too

employee-friendly and "Congress's use of its funding whims as a control on the EEOC in mind").
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model, forcing employers to take this step more seriously,3' while Maurice
E. R. Munroe has recommended that the agency get out of the chargeprocessing busineSs 32 altogether and use its funding solely for large-scale
litigation.33
Most of the scholarly concerns raised regarding the agency, however,
are structural in nature. These arguments contend that even if Congress
were more generous with the EEOC's funding, fundamental flaws would
remain in the design of employment discrimination law enforcement.
Marcia McCormick, for example, has questioned whether the rights of
"rank and file employees" can ever be adequately protected under the
judicial enforcement model since pursuing low-value claims is not
financially worthwhile for attorneys, and discrimination cases are difficult
to win pro se. 34 McCormick and others have consequently advocated for
granting the agency adjudicative powers and shifting the agency's focus
away from investigating every claim. 35 Based on similar concerns, Michael
Selmi has recommended that the EEOC be transformed from a mandatory
into an optional step for employment discrimination claimants, or more
radically, that the agency should be eliminated altogether.36 These repeated

31. See id. at 355 (proposing that "private mediation sessions will become the main charge
processing vehicle instead of the charge prioritizing triage procedures currently being used by the
EEOC").
32. To gain relief under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act, a claimant must first
exhaust her administrative remedies-that is, file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days (or 300 days
in states with a Fair Employment Practice Agency). For a summary of the charge-filing process, and the

nonimportance of the EEOC's investigatory determination, see Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC:
Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 57 OHiO ST. L.J. 1,6-10 (1996).
33. See Munroe, supra note 2, at 220-21 (arguing that "The EEOC can do more to reduce
discrimination by spending its resources on attacking practices than by spending the same funds on

resolving individual complaints, . . .").
34.
Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination
Enforcementfor the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 227 (2009) ("Rank
and file employees lack access to the courts because they cannot find attorneys to take their cases, in

part because the cases are so difficult to win.")
35. See id. at 227 (arguing that "a federal agency that performs adjudication can provide greater
access to justice for employees and small employers, and stronger enforcement than reliance on the
court system or ADR alone"); see also Pam Jenoff, As Equal as Others? Rethinking Access to

DiscriminationLaw, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 85, 90 (2012) (proposing that the "EEOC should also be given
adjudicative authority, not just investigative authority, and should be the primary vehicle for individuals
seeking redress from small employers. Employees of larger entities who do have the option of bringing
claims in court should be given the option of pursuing administrative adjudication or bypassing the
agency and proceeding directly to court in order to avoid duplicative processes and waste of
resources."). Interestingly, the idea of granting the EEOC adjudicatory powers surfaced several times in
the early years of the agency. For a brief recounting of this history-and a full consideration of
Congress's choice to withhold adjudicatory power from the EEOC-see Margaret H. Lemos, The
Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63
VAND. L. REv. 363, 3 83-88 (2010).
36.

Selmi, supra note 32, at 10 (arguing that the agency's current "procedures amount to a rather

strange and vacuous process-one where thousands of claims are filed at no financial cost to the
plaintiff, few are truly investigated, fewer still resolved, and none of which is binding on any of the
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calls for sweeping reform-to the point of abolishing the current federal
enforcement agency and starting from scratch-juxtaposed with the lack of
consensus on the most effective type of reform raises the question: what are
the design characteristics of an effective discrimination law? That question
is precisely what this article seeks to answer by way of qualitative and
quantitative comparison of local discrimination laws. Yet before turning to
this analysis, stepping back to consider prior work on the role of
institutional design choices, both inside and outside the employment
context, is warranted.
B. Improving the Future Design
As discussed in the prior Subpart, scholarly critiques, which have
principally focused on federal discrimination laws, have identified four
harmful consequences of current enforcement mechanisms. By depriving
the EEOC of any adjudicative authority, discrimination victims are forced
to pursue relief for unsettled claims in court, which is both time-consuming
and costly. Related to this concern is that representation is more critical in
judicial adjudication, but attorneys may be difficult to find, or completely
unattainable, for low-value claimants. Even for discrimination victims who
are able to secure representation, the delays introduced by the EEOC's
investigatory process prolong victim access to a remedy, especially for
meritorious claims that fail to settle at the agency level and proceed to
further docket-related bottlenecks in federal court. Finally, to the extent
that victims wish to avoid the delays of litigation, utilizing alternative
dispute resolution may prove challenging since mediation is not required
by the agency and the employer may decline to participate. This Part will
consider potential design solutions to these four consequences of the
present design, looking to prior literature on the efficacy of alternatives.
1. Are Administrative Remedies Superior to JudicialRemedies?
Many scholars have lamented the EEOC's lack of adjudicative
authority, but how much adjudicative authority the agency should have
remains a source of debate. Some have argued that providing a mandatory
administrative remedy for discrimination claimants through the EEOC is
the best solution." Others have argued that providing an optional
parties. Ironically, despite their apparent vacuity, these administrative procedures have led to a
tremendous amount of litigation with issues ranging from the particular time-frames for filing a claim to
the scope of the charge, to the weight to be accorded a cause or no-cause determination, to the time a

right-to-sue notice has been received").
37. Under the mandatory approach, individuals would not be able to use the judicial system to
vindicate their discrimination claim. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
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administrative remedy through the agency would be ideal.
Even if an
optional administrative remedy is the most suitable solution, less clear is
whether a claimant's pursuit of an administrative remedy should preclude
pursuit of a judicial remedy. Given the multiple calls for administrative
adjudication-but the lack of consensus on the details of such a reformstepping back to assess the comparative benefits of administrative
adjudication, even outside the employment discrimination context,
becomes a useful exercise.
On one hand, substituting administrative enforcement for judicial
enforcement gives the agency control over the claims and issues pursued.
This control may prove particularly helpful in the employment
discrimination context, where complaints about meritless claims congesting
federal court dockets 39 as well as complaints about the difficulties of
enforcing meritorious claimS 40 abound. On the other hand, in the absence of
judicial enforcement, the agency has complete control over the claims and
issues that are enforced. Complete agency control potentially stifles the
amount of enforcement (given the agency's budgetary constraints), the type
of enforcement (since the agency must determine its priorities in the face of
constraints), and innovative theories of enforcement (since private plaintiffs
and attorneys have less input into the agency's actions).4 1
Giving claimants the choice of pursuing an administrative remedy, a
judicial remedy, or both might be an optimal middle ground; after all, a
fundamental tenet of economic theory is that more choice is better. Even
Discriminationin Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. LJ. 1619, 1655 (1991)
("First, private individuals should not be able to bring suits for discriminatory treatment under the
employment discrimination laws. Discriminatory treatment claims should be screened in the way that

unfair labor practice claims are currently screened by the National Labor Relations Board: a
government agency decides, on the basis of an informal investigation, whether the claim has merit.").

38.

For example, Selmi, supra note 32, at 60-63, considers the possibility of giving the agency

enough adjudicative powers to address low-value claims that might not be worth bringing in a judicial

setting. He dismisses the idea of adjudicating all discrimination claims through the EEOC, however,
because proposals to move to an exclusively administrative remedy "ignore the actual operation of the
EEOC, which issues cause findings in so few cases and resolves comparatively few cases in favor of
plaintiffs that allowing the EEOC to have the final word on claims of discrimination-without a
substantial restructuring of the agency-would be tantamount to providing employers a license to

discriminate."
39.

Accord Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will

Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REv. 62, 64 (2008) (arguing that the "proliferation of these
meritless claims [in employment cases] causes many problems, including public suspicion about the
necessity or effectiveness of our anti-discrimination laws, as well as an employer's reluctance to hire
employees who might be deemed more difficult to fire because they can at least fashion a plausible
claim against their employers (regardless of the ultimate success of that claim)").
40.

Accord Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse?, supra note 6 (arguing that employment

discrimination plaintiffs (and their attorneys) are unlikely to succeed in federal court and as a result, are
discouraged from filing actions).
41. For a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of agency enforcement, see Matthew
C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of

AdministrativeAgencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 106-21 (2005).
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still, individuals may make the wrong choice-that is, pursuing a judicial
remedy when they would be better served to pursue an administrative
remedy (or vice versa). Or they may all make the same choice-for
example, if everyone chooses an administrative remedy over a judicial
remedy, disastrous consequences may ensue if the agency is not equipped
to handle every claim. Moreover, if claimants are not forced to choose, and
instead are allowed to pursue simultaneous administrative and judicial
remedies, serious questions arise regarding the efficiency and wastefulness
of duplicative enforcement actions.
Finally, whether administrative remedies are the panacea that prior
discrimination scholars have argued them to be somewhat depends on how
agency decision-making compares to judicial decision-making. The
EEOC's historically liberal interpretations of discrimination laws 4 2 may
suggest that agency adjudication would bring about different results (at
least in some cases) than judicial adjudication. But in examining this issue
in the context of Title VII and the EEOC, Margaret Lemos has concluded
that the EEOC's historically liberal position is the direct result of its lack of
adjudicative powers. Lemos further argues that "courts may act more like
agencies than is commonly assumed. Judges' methodological commitments
lead them to seek coherence both across and within statutes, which
generates a form of inter-issue consistency."4 3 By way of extension,
Lemos's argument implies that granting the EEOC claim-adjudication
powers may not increase the overall level of enforcement or amount of
remedies granted to discrimination victims-particularly if it results in the
agency becoming less liberal in its construction of employment
discrimination statutes.
Still, the group that undoubtedly stands to gain the most ground from
the introduction of an administrative remedy is low-value claimants. The
plight of low-value claimants in the absence of an administrative remedy
has already been raised by employment discrimination scholars, but similar
arguments exist in other areas of the law. For example, multiple scholars
have argued that judicial adjudication favors politically and financially
powerful parties;" to the extent that low-value claimants overlap with lowincome individuals, 4 5 such arguments support the idea that low-value
42. Accord Lemos, supra note 35, at 389 ("[T]he EEOC's interpretations of Title VU have, on
the whole, been more 'liberal' than the Court's.")
43. Id. at 435.
44. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-50 (1994); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory

Justify More IntrusiveJudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law
and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206-07, 217 (1982).
45. Accord Selmi, supra note 32, at 33 (1996) ("Moreover, to the extent that low-damage claims
21
are correlated with low-wage jobs, these cases may be concentrated among low-income individuals.1
Given that members of minority groups and women are also disproportionately found among low-
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claimants will never be well served by judicial adjudication of
discrimination claims. Relatedly, one of the most common arguments
raised in favor of administrative adjudication of discrimination claims is
the fact that low-value claimants are unable to find representation, which is
essential for the claimant's success under judicial adjudication. For this
reason, the role of representation in claim outcomes is explored next.
2.

The Problem ofRepresentation in Low- Value Claims

Employment discrimination scholars have repeatedly pointed to the
difficulty of finding an attorney for a low-value discrimination claim. 4 6 Of
course, low-value claimants may nonetheless proceed without the
assistance of an attorney, but is proceeding pro se a certain failure? The
question has never been explored empirically in the employment
discrimination context, although anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the
difficulty of succeeding without the assistance of an attorney. Employment
discrimination claims are procedurally complex to litigate, 47 suggesting that
pro se discrimination plaintiffs may face an uphill battle. Yet pleading
standards are less stringent for pro se plaintiffs, 48 and courts may further
relax other standards of the litigation process for claimants without an
attorney. If judicial standards are sufficiently and systematically relaxed,
then pro se discrimination cases may not necessarily be doomed to failure.
In the absence of empirical evidence within the employment
discrimination context, examining evidence from other contexts can shed
light on the plusses and perils of proceeding without an attorney-although
admittedly, the conclusions drawn from prior pro se research are mixed.
For example, a 2015 study on the effect of counsel in immigration court
proceedings found that represented parties "fare[d] better at every stage of
the court process-that is, their cases [we]re more likely to be terminated,
they [we]re more likely to seek relief, and they [we]re more likely to obtain
the relief they s[ought].'A 9 The procedural complexity of immigration
proceedings analogizes well to employment discrimination proceedings,
income groups, these cases may disproportionately involve race, gender or national origin claimsprecisely the kind of cases that the system should target.").
46. Accord McCormick, supra note 34, at 227 (lamenting the difficulties of representation access
faced by "[r]ank and file employees").
47. Cf Sullivan, supra note 27, at 192 ("Hidden beneath judicial and scholarly obsession with
formal proof structures for individual disparate treatment cases is a simpler, more direct method of
establishing discrimination.").
48. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("[Plro se complaint[s], 'however
inartfully pleaded,' [are] held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers'
.... " (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam))).
49. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015).
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suggesting that the same conclusions might be inferred for pro se
discrimination plaintiffs.
Yet other recent evidence from the employment contextunemployment benefit appeals-counsels caution in drawing too many
inferences from the immigration study. This 2012 study found that
randomized offers of free representation from a legal clinic "had no
statistically significant effect on the probability that a claimant would
prevail, but ... did delay the adjudicatory process."so Unemployment
appeals are administrative, not judicial, in nature, again suggesting caution
in drawing too many inferences with respect to employment discrimination
cases. But given the generally contradictory findings of these two empirical
studies, perhaps the only takeaway is that individuals may be capable of
credibly representing themselves-as long as they are given sufficient
resources and support to do so.si
3.

The Value of Time

The right to a speedy trial is only guaranteed in criminal proceedings, 52
yet parties typically favor swift adjudication in other types of proceedings
as well. 53 Economic theory teaches the monetary value of time; 54 along
these lines, prior scholars have raised concerns regarding the adverse
effects of adjudication delays in a variety of contexts. 5 As Jean Sternlight
has argued, such concerns are particularly heightened in the employment
discrimination context because

50.

D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal

Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118,

2124 (2012).
51. This argument has been made previously in the criminal context. See Stephanos Bibas,
Shrinking Gideon and ExpandingAlternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287, 1300 (2013)
("A meaningful alternative to providing lawyers would be to simplify smaller cases, which would make
it easier for pro se litigants to navigate them on their own.").

52.

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

53.

Accord Michael J. Bolton, Choosingto Consent to a MagistrateJudge: A Client's View, FED.

LAW. 90, 91 (May/June 2014) (reporting that parties, and particularly corporate parties, favor speedy
trials). On the other hand, a party may introduce unnecessary delays into litigation in order to pressure
the other side into settlement. See generally J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory

of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 59 (2016).
54.

Cf Paul Heaton & Eric Helland, Judicial Expendituresand Litigation Access: Evidence from

Auto Injuries, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 303 (2011) ("[A]s adjudication time falls, the value of pursuing a
suit increases, so plaintiff demand for suits shifts outward.").
55.

See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from

the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 1651 (2015) (discussing the problems surrounding long
adjudication times in medical malpractice cases, which "exacerbate stress on doctors, deny
compensation to needy and deserving claimants, encourage malingering, complicate insurance pricing,
and impede physicians' efforts to learn from their mistakes, . . ."); Daniel Kessler, InstitutionalCauses
of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 432 (1996) (demonstrating
empirically that trial court delays also delay settlement).
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[w]hile there is often a societal interest in resolving legal claims
quickly, the interest in speedy resolution is particularly strong in
the case of employment discrimination claims. From the victim's
standpoint, delay is often an amplification of the problems that
have already been alleged. For example, a person who brings a
claim of employment discrimination for denial of promotion or
benefits while still retaining her job at the company is in a very
awkward position.... Equally, the claimant who has been fired or
denied a job often has a rather desperate need for salary or
benefits.

...

Time is also a critical factor from the perspective of

the alleged perpetrator. The individual who has been accused of
discrimination often feels that she has been vilified or slandered.
She wants the claim to be resolved quickly, and in her favor, so
that she can earn back the respect of her employer, friends, and
family. Equally, the company, whether or not it has been directly
named as a defendant, would typically prefer to end the claim of
discrimination as quickly as possible.56
Notwithstanding these arguments for swift adjudication of employment
discrimination cases, in reality, such cases are rife with delays-beginning
at the EEOC's claim investigation phase, which can often draw out longer
than one year.57
Although no empirical evidence exists regarding the effect of delays on
employment discrimination claims, empirical evidence from the torts
context suggests that such delays may discourage plaintiffs from
vindicating their rights. A 2011 study presented suggestive empirical
evidence that increasing state-level court expenditures encourages parties
injured in automobile accidents to pursue litigation.58 The study's authors
theorized that increasing court expenditures, among other things, decreases
adjudication time and thus reduces the cost of plaintiffs vindicating their
rights through litigation.59 If this finding is generalizable outside the
automobile accident context, it suggests that the delays associated with
employment discrimination adjudication may discourage plaintiffs with
meritorious claims from coming forward. Indeed, evidence already exists

56.

Jean R.

Stemlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment

.

DiscriminationLaws: A ComparativeAnalysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1401, 1480-81 (2004).
57. See Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, supra note 28 (estimating that claim
investigation averages approximately one year in her office).
58. See Heaton & Helland, supranote 54.
59. See id. at 329 ("[C]ase delay likely represents an important barrier to access . .
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that fewer discrimination plaintiffs are coming forward; 60 slow adjudication
times may at least partially explain why.
4.

Mediation: Worthwhile or Wasteful?

The slow adjudication times of employment discrimination claims
make alternative dispute resolution options sound appealing. Yet whether
such options can remedy the current problems in employment
discrimination enforcement depends upon their underlying efficacy. Early
survey evidence indicated that, at least from a procedural justice
standpoint, claimants preferred lawyers and traditional adjudicative
methods. 6 1 Nevertheless, more recent empirical research has called these
early findings into question; at least two experimental studies have
suggested that litigants prefer processes in which they have some control
over presentation of the evidence, as in a mediation proceeding.62 Even in
the criminal context, surveys of defendants report higher satisfaction with
the fairness, accuracy, and outcomes in victim-offender mediation
processes, as compared to traditional criminal adversarial processes.6 3
Furthermore, experimental evidence indicates that alternatives to traditional
adversarial processes are not only perceived to be fairer and more accurate;
they actually are fairer and more accurate.
This experimental and survey evidence appears to suggest that
alternative dispute resolution, and particularly mediation, may be the
solution to the woes of employment discrimination law enforcement.
However, the EEOC incorporated mediation into its charge investigation
process over fifteen years ago6 5 -and the problems in employment

60.

See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse?, supra note 6, at 117-20 (showing that

employment discrimination lawsuit filings declined between 2002 and 2007, although attributing the
decline to low success rates in discrimination cases).
61.

See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL

ANALYSIs (1975). For a helpful summary of the literature on adjudicative, inquisitorial, and alternative
dispute resolution, see Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice:
Contributionsfrom Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 976-84 (2006).
62. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

3-4, 363-75 (1988); Donna Shestowsky, ProceduralPreferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A
Close, Modern Look at an OldIdea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211, 230-46 (2004).
63. See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of EmpiricalResearch on the Psychological
Outcomes ofRestorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 179-93.

64.

See, e.g., Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary PretrialProceduresand Testimonial

Evidence: Effects ofLawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320,

322-29 (1980); Neil Vidmar & Nancy M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses'
Communication ofEvidence and the Assessment ofAdjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

888, 888-98 (1983).
65. For a history of the agency's mediation program, see History of the EEOC Mediation
Program, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/history.cfm

(last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
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discrimination enforcement still remain. Recall that the EEOC's mediation
process is optional, not mandatory, so employers may decline to
participate. Mediation also occurs prior to cause determination, at a time
when employers may take a discrimination claim less seriously. Thus,
perhaps it is not the mediation itself that is the problem with the agency's
current program, but instead the timing and discretion in participating. 66 In
sum, evaluating the mechanisms behind successful discrimination law
enforcement regimes requires looking beyond the mere existence of an
alternative dispute resolution program-and instead assessing program
details like timing and participation requirements. With these lessons of the
institutional design literature in mind, I turn now to the comparative study
of ten local employment discrimination law regimes.
III. TESTING THE EFFICACY OF WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A.

Weight andAppearance DiscriminationLaws: An Overview

Obese workers face an unenviable situation in the labor market. Over

two decades of economics research has shown that obese workers, and
particularly female obese workers, encounter both a wage penalty and
lower rates of employment compared to their normal-weight counterparts.6 7
No researcher, thus far, has been able to account fully for these trends
based on productivity differences alone, and in fact, a recent study indicates
that at least some of the obesity penalty arises from taste- or preferencebased discrimination against the obese in the labor market. 68 The
economics research does not indicate that the obesity penalty is
diminishing over time; 69 simultaneously, obesity rates are burgeoning
throughout the United States. Over the past two decades, the adult obesity

66.

Recall Michael Z. Green's proposal to reform the EEOC charge process through a

mandatory, instead of optional, mediation program. See Green, supra note 2, at 347-50.
67. See, e.g., Susan Averett.& Sanders Korenman, The Economic Reality of The Beauty Myth,

31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304 (1996); John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 451 (2004); Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight

in Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008 (1993); Jose A. Pagan & Alberto
Davila, Obesity, OccupationalAttainment, andEarnings, 78 Soc. Sa. Q. 756 (1997).
68. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal Frameworkfor
Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2016) (demonstrating that

employers exclude obese women, but not obese men, from high-paying jobs that require interaction
with the public and, as a result, obese women are forced to work in low-paying jobs that require high
levels of physical activity and have poor working conditions).
Compare id with Gortmaker et al., supra note 67 (finding similar obesity penalties in
69.
employment using data that are two decades apart).
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rate has tripled, growing from less than 12% in 1991 to its current rate of
34.9%.70
This rapid increase in obesity juxtaposed with the continued presence
of an obesity penalty in the labor market suggests the potential need-or, at
the very least, growing demand-for a legal solution. The absence of an
explicit federal remedy seems to leave obese individuals who encounter
weight discrimination in the labor market without legal protection.n In ten
jurisdictions across the country, however, obese individuals are
unequivocally protected against weight-based discrimination. Very little
work, scholarly or otherwise, has been done regarding these ten laws.72 The
dates of passage, protected categories, procedures, and remedies available
under the laws are summarized in Table 1; a more detailed account of the
laws is presented in the Appendix.
As Table 1 makes clear, the laws have some features in common, in
spite of being passed at very different times for very different reasons. All
ten jurisdictions with a local law have an oversight commission, and, at a
minimum, all provide compensatory damages relief for successful
claimants. Four of the local laws enumerate weight specifically as a
protected class; the other six protect personal/physical appearance more
broadly. Eight of the ten laws (with the exception of Madison and Urbana)
allow claimants to resolve their claims through private suit, and eight of the
ten laws (with the exception of Santa Cruz and Binghamton) allow
claimants to resolve their claims through an administrative process. Within
the eight jurisdictions that allow for both administrative and judicial
enforcement, the processes are almost always mutually exclusive--only
San Francisco permits claimants to pursue simultaneous judicial and
administrative actions. In addition to traditional dispute resolution

70.
Obesity Trends Among U.S. Adults Between 1985 and 2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/downloads/obesitytrends_2010.pdf
(last

visited Oct. 9, 2016).
71. Some obese individuals may have an employment discrimination claim under the Americans
with Disabilities Act or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. For an exploration of when weight-based
discrimination is prohibited under these two federal laws, and when each statutory remedy applies, see
Shinall, supra note 68.

72. In fact, no one has ever before assembled a complete list of these laws. One legal scholar has
briefly considered the laws in Michigan, Urbana, Madison, Washington, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and
Howard County-but the analysis leaves out Binghamton, Prince George's County, and Harford
County. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND

LAW 113-32 (2010). Another scholar of labor economics has also mentioned the laws in Michigan,
Urbana, Madison, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and Howard County-but similarly neglects the laws in
Binghamton, Washington, and the two other Maryland Counties. DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, BEAUTY
PAYS: WHY ATTRACTIVE PEOPLE ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL 152-53 (2011). Even the list compiled by

the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA), the premier weight discrimination
rights organization, is incomplete, as it leaves the three Maryland Counties off its list. See Weight
DiscriminationLaws, NAAFA, http://www.naafaonline.com/dev2/educationIlaws.html (last visited Oct.
9,2016).
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processes, all but one jurisdiction (Binghamton) has an alternative dispute
resolution program, although the jurisdictions vary on whether program
participation is mandatory (Madison, Santa Cruz, Urbana, Washington) or
optional (Howard County, Harford County, Michigan, Prince George's
County, San Francisco).
Perhaps the most surprising feature of these laws that stands out within
Table 1 is the date of passage. Even though obesity is typically considered
a recent public health issue-the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention pinpoint the start of the "obesity epidemic" at the early
1990S 73 -seven of the weight/personal appearance discrimination laws
passed in the 1970s. In one case, Michigan, the law's passage was
visionary and, arguably, ahead of its time. There, a lone state
representative, Thomas Mathieu, championed the addition of weight as an
enumerated category within Michigan's civil rights law in 1976. Mathieu, a
former grassroots organizer, was inspired to take on the novel cause after
seeing "with [his] own eyes how people lost out on job opportunities, just
because of the way they looked.... [He] was deeply moved by the persons
who had suffered such job rejections, simply because of the way they
74
looked. Mostly it was overweight females ....
For the other seven local laws originating in the 1970s, however,
concerns about using appearance as pretext for other types of
discrimination motivated passage. The most common concern was racial
discrimination; the legislative councils in Washington, D.C. and the three
Maryland counties sought to prohibit employers from discriminating
against African-Americans on the basis of wearing their hair in natural
styles, cornrows, or dreadlocks, or on the basis of wearing traditional
African garments. Concerns about sex discrimination against men with
long hair also motivated the passage of laws in Madison, Washington, and
Howard County,76 while sexual-orientation discrimination motivated the

73. See Obesity Trends, supra note 70; see also The Obesity Epidemic, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
http://www.cdc.gov/cdctv/diseaseandconditions/lifestyle/obesityPREVENTION,
AND
CONTROL

epidemic.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
74.

Email from Thomas C. Mathieu, Former Michigan State Representative from Grand Rapids,

to author (Aug. 17, 2011) (on file with author).
75. See Proceedings of Public Hearings: Hearing on Bill No. 76-81, Harford Cty. Council,
Legis. Day No. 76-33, at 46 (Md. 1976) (on file with Harford Cty., Md., Council),
http://www5.harfordcountymd.gov/WebLink8/0/doc/3312/Page29.aspx; Telephone Interview with C.
Vernon Gray, Adm'r, Howard Cty., Md. Office of Human Rights (Oct. 28, 2013) (on file with author);
e-mail from Michael Lyles, Prince George's Cty. Human Relations Comm'n Exec. Dir., to author (Nov.
12, 2013) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Sterling Tucker, Former Chairman, D.C. City
Council (Sept. 14, 2011).
76. See Equal Opportunity Report, CAPITAL TIMEs, Sep. 24, 1975, at 24; Telephone Interview
with C. Vernon Gray, supra note 75; Telephone Interview with Sterling Tucker, supranote 75.
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passage of laws in Madison and Urbana.7 7 Indeed, according to the
advocate whose efforts were largely responsible for the passage of
Urbana's law, the legislative council added appearance as an enumerated
category in order to distract the public from the law's real, and more
controversial,
purpose:
the
prohibition
of sexual-orientation
discrimination.
In contrast to the motivations behind most of the 1970s laws-in which
concerns about appearance discrimination were secondary to concerns
about other types of discrimination-the motivations behind the three
modern laws in Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and Binghamton were (at least
in part) appearance discrimination. Indeed, one specific type of appearance
discrimination particularly concerned the legislative councils in these three
cities: weight discrimination. 7 9 For example, although advocacy efforts in
Santa Cruz initially arose due to concerns about sexual orientation
discrimination (and the lack of legal protections at the state level), the
effort only gained traction with the local council once LGBT advocates
joined forces with local fat rights 80 advocates to push for a new law "to
protect more of the non-mainstream."8 1 The San Francisco law traces its
origins to a February 1999 billboard campaign by 24 Hour Fitness that
depicted an alien and the message, "When they come, they'll eat the fat
ones first." 82 The protests, advocacy efforts, and hearings that followed led
the local council to adopt new protections against weight discrimination the
following year.83 Like Santa Cruz, Binghamton's law was initially aimed at

77. See Equal Opportunity Report, supra note 76; Press Release, Jeffrey Graubart, JUSTICE
NOW! (Mar. 2, 1976),
http://outhistory.org/oldwiki/PressReleaseInitiatingthe Sit-in; Telephone Interview with Dr. John
Peterson, Former Urbana, Ill. City Councilman (Jan. 26, 2012).

78.

See e-mail from Jeffrey Graubart to author (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author).

79.

These three laws explicitly enumerate weight as a protected class. See BINGHAMTON, N.Y.,

MUNICIPAL CODE § 45-2 (2008); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE
MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.83.120 (1995).
80.

§

3307(b) (2002); SANTA CRUZ, CAL.,

The fat rights movement (the preferred name chosen by members of the movement)

advocates for acceptance of all body types.
81.

Laura Myers, Santa Cruz Moves to Protectthe Weird, PRESCOTr COURIER, Jan. 15, 1992, at

3A,
https://news.google.com/newspapersnid=886&dat-1 9920115&id=vakkAAAAIBAJ&sjid
=snODAAAAIBAJ&pg-6871,2638284&hl=en. The Body Image Task Force, National Organization of
Women, and the Woman's Intemational League for Peace and Freedom also joined the LGBT
advocates. Correspondence Folder for Ordinance 92-11 (1992) (on file with Santa Cruz, Cal. City Clerk
Office).
82. Edward Epstein & Ken Hoover, Ammiano Takes Aim at Fat Bias. Supervisor Wants Laws to
Cover Fat Individuals, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1999, at A16; Ulysses Torassa, Persons of Heft Protest

Health Club's Ad Saying Space Aliens Would Gobble Up FatFolks, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 16, 1999, at
Al.
83. See, e.g., ; Edward Epstein, Fat People Get a Positive Hearingin S.F.: Supervisors Set Vote
on ProtectedStatus, S.F. CHRON., May 4, 2000, at Al; Epstein & Hoover, supra note 82; Jason B.
Johnson, S.F. Rights Commission Flexes Muscle: Panel, FatActivists Write Letter Over Gym Billboard,

S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1999, at A20; Torassa, supra note 82.
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filling the gap in state-level protections for LGBT individuals who
experienced discrimination, but the liberal councilmember sponsoring the
new legislation soon decided that "since we were creating a new law, we
might as well create as comprehensive [a] law as possible."84 As a result,
Binghamton relied on the San Francisco law (and on the advice of
advocates responsible for the San Francisco law) as a model for its weight
discrimination law.
Undoubtedly, some common themes run through the legislative
histories of weight and appearance discrimination laws. Yet important
differences remain at the enforcement level. First, the remedies for
successful claimants vary significantly in size. The most generous local
discrimination laws (Harford County, Michigan, Santa Cruz, Washington)
not only provide for compensatory damages but also injunctive relief, civil
fines, and attorney fees. Second, in addition to the previously discussed
variation in judicial and administrative procedures available to enforce the
laws, the support for claimants, particularly claimants pursuing
administrative remedies, provided by local commissions differs. In
jurisdictions like Urbana and Prince George's County, the oversight
commission director serves as prosecutor in cases that make it to the
hearing stage, eliminating the claimant's need for a lawyer.87 Madison
facilitates self-representation in the administrative process by providing
claimants with specific instructions on how to present evidence, while
Washington, D.C. appoints attorneys to represent claimants in
administrative hearings. 89 Third, adjudication time varies sharply between
jurisdictions. For example, Urbana sets any claim found to have probable
cause for an administrative hearing if not resolved within forty-two days. 90
On the other hand, the timeliness of enforcement in the judicial setting is
heavily dependent on local court dockets.91 With all these differences and

84. E-mail from Sean G. Massey, Former Binghamton, N.Y. City Councilmember, to author
(Jan. 25, 2011) (on file with author).
85. Id.
86. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2603-2605 (2013); ). D.C. CODE § 2-1403.13 (2001); SANTA
CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE

§ 9.83.120

(1995); HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE

§§

95-13 to 95-14

(1978
87. See Telephone Interview with Todd Rent, Urbana, Ill. Human Relations Officer (Jan. 3,
2012); e-mail from Michael Lyles, supra note 75.
88.

See,

e.g.,

Equal

Opportunities

Commission,

CITY

OF

MADISON,

http://www.cityofmadison.com/dcr/commeoc.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
89.
See Employment, Education, and Public Accommodation Complaints: What to Expect,
http://ohr.dc.gov/
OFFICE
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publication/attachments/EmploymentFlowChart.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,

2016).
90.

See Telephone Interview with Todd Rent, supranote 87.

91.

Court dockets at the local, state, and federal levels are famously congested; for a discussion

of at least one adverse effect associated with burgeoning court dockets, see Bert I. Huang, Lightened
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similarities between the ten laws in mind, the next Part empirically tests the
effectiveness of each law on employment outcomes of obese workers.
B. Methodology andData
To test the effectiveness of the ten local laws discussed in the previous
Part, I use a difference-in-differences approach.92 The idea behind
difference-in-differences, also known as double-difference estimation,93 is
to compare employment of the obese inside a jurisdiction with a weightdiscrimination law to employment of the obese in nearby, similar
jurisdictions without such a law.9 4 The difference-in-differences estimate
will be equal to the boost in employment that obese workers receive in
jurisdictions with a weight-discrimination law, differencing out (1)
employment of the obese in nearby jurisdictions without such a law, and
(2) employment of the non-obese inside and outside the jurisdiction.
In order to estimate the effects of each law using difference-indifferences, I use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is a health survey dataset administered
annually by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) since
1984. Although only fifteen states participated in the first year of the
BRFSS, most states participated by 1990, and all states and territories have
participated from 1994 until the most recent year of availability, 2012.9'

Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1127-52 (2011) (presenting empirical evidence of less frequent
appellate reversals when court dockets are overwhelmed).
92. Throughout this paper, I will use the terms "difference-in-differences estimation" and
"double-difference estimation" interchangeably to describe the empirical technique outlined above.
Similarly, I will use the terms "difference-in-difference-in-differences
difference estimation" to describe the empirical technique outlined below.

estimation" and "triple-

93. More formally, my estimation procedure takes the following form for each of the ten
jurisdictions: Y = Xf/ + OY +]Y2 + (O *])y3 + Ti + E. Here, Y is an indicator variable equal to one
if the individual is employed for wages. X is a vector of individual demographic characteristics that
includes age, race, ethnicity, education, and marital status, and 0 is an indicator variable equal to one if

the individual is obese (i.e. the individual has a body mass index (BMI) greater than or equal to thirty).
J is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual lives in a jurisdiction with a weight- or personal
appearance-discrimination law, and T is a set of year indicator variables. The coefficient of interest, y3,
is the difference-in-differences estimate.
94. In the results presented here, I compare employment and labor market participation rates of
obese individuals in the jurisdiction with legal protection to the employment and labor market
participation rates of obese individuals in the rest of the state. As a robustness check (not reported here),
I have also used surrounding counties and similarly sized cities within the state as comparators (instead

of using the entire rest of the state as a comparator). The results are substantially the same. In addition,
the results presented here are estimated using a linear probability model. I have also estimated the

results using a probit model (not reported here), and the results are very similar.
95.

See Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND

PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2016). This study will only use data from
1985 onward as the 1984 data does not contain all of the variables of interest necessary for this study.
Although state-by-state 2013 and 2014 data are now available, BRFSS stopped releasing county-level
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The BRFSS is ideal for the present study because of its large size; each
year of the BRFSS contains at least 50,000 respondents. Since some
jurisdictions with weight-discrimination laws are quite small in
population-including Urbana, Illinois (2012 population: 41,581),
Binghamton, New York (2012 population: 46,551), and Santa Cruz,
California (2012 population: 62,041) 96-smaller datasets will not contain a
sufficient number of observations from these jurisdictions.9
Because the focus of the BRFSS is health status and behaviors, the
survey asks respondents to self-report their weight and height,98 from
which I calculate their BMIs. In addition to the health-related questions, the
BRFSS asks respondents about their age, gender, race, ethnicity, education,
and marital status. The BRFSS also asks respondents whether they are
employed, to which they can answer that they are employed for wages,
self-employed, out of work for less than one year, out of work for more
than one year, a homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work. To
construct my dependent variable of interest, employed for wages, I create
an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is employed for wages,
and equal to zero for all other respondents.9 9 In later estimations, I will also
look at labor market participation, 0 0 which I define as an indicator variable

data in the 2013 survey. County-level data is necessary to identify all ten jurisdictions.of interest in this

study.
96. Population Estimates, IncorporatedPlaces and Minor Civil Divisions Datasets: Subcounty
Resident Population Estimates: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2012/SUB-EST2012.html
97.

When estimating a double-difference

(last visited Sept. 14, 2016).

estimate for Santa Cruz,

San Francisco, and

Binghamton, I will only use the BRFSS data that was collected in the years following the passage of
their weight/personal appearance laws. Thus, I will use 1993-2012 BRFSS data for Santa Cruz, 20012012 BRFSS data for San Francisco, and 2009-2012 BRFSS data for Binghamton.
98. Using self-reported weight and height data may raise concerns about measurement error (in
particular, systematic under-reporting of weight and/or systematic over-reporting of height), which
could bias the results. But several researchers have demonstrated that any bias from using self-reported
weight and height is not severe and generally does not affect the results. See, e.g., Cawley, supra note
67, at 451-74 (2004); John Cawley et al., Occupation-Specific Absenteeism Costs Associated with

Obesity and Morbid Obesity, 49 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED., 1317, 1318 (2007); Darius
Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Labor Supply and Weight, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 85, 92 (2007);
Charles L. Baum & Shin-Yi Chou, The Socio-Economic Causes of Obesity (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 17423, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7423.pdf.
99. I examine differences in employment for wages instead of employment generally (i.e.,
employment for wages and self-employment) because antidiscrimination laws should only increase the

number of individuals employed for wages. Individuals who are self-employed should not have
discriminated against themselves, so I would not expect to see an increase in self-employment as the

result of an antidiscrimination law. (If anything, I would expect to see a decrease in self-employment
since some individuals might have chosen self-employment after being unable to find employment for
wages). Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I have tested the effects of the ten laws on employment
generally-including self-employment-and the results are very similar to the ones presented in Part
I.C.
100. For an explanation why labor market participation is an important indicator of labor market
success, see infra Part III.C.
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equal to one if the individual is employed for wages, self-employed, or out
of work (for more or less than one year), and equal to zero otherwise.
Because the BRFSS contains observations going back to the 1980s, for
the two most recent weight-discrimination laws in San Francisco and
Binghamton, I can perform a second estimation, which compares labor
market outcomes of the obese inside and outside a jurisdiction with a
weight-discrimination law before and after the law passed.101 In other
words, for these two jurisdictions, I can go beyond a double-difference
estimate and obtain a triple-difference (or difference-in-difference-indifferences) estimate. 102 The triple-difference estimate will represent the
change in employment of the obese within a jurisdiction with a weightdiscrimination law, differencing out (1) changes in employment of the
obese inside the jurisdiction before the law passed, (2) changes in
employment of the obese outside the jurisdiction before and after the law
passed, and (3) changes in employment of the non-obese inside and outside
the jurisdiction both before and after the law passed. With these estimation
techniques in mind, I turn now to present the results of my estimates.
C. Results
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the percentage of the
population employed for wages by BMI classification (underweight/normal
weight, overweight, and obese) and by jurisdiction. 10 3 For each of the ten
jurisdictions with a weight or personal-appearance discrimination law,
summary statistics for the surrounding state (or in the case of Michigan and
DC, for bordering states) are also presented for comparison. In the ten
jurisdictions and their surrounding states, overweight men tend to have the
highest rates of employment for wages, while for women, the underweight
and normal weight generally have the highest rates of employment for
wages. In a few instances, however, obese individuals have the highest
rates of employment for wages in their jurisdictions. Obese men in Urbana,
Santa Cruz, Harford County, and Howard County, and obese women in

,

101. Although the Santa Cruz law was passed in 1992, the BRFSS does not contain enough pre1992 observations from Santa Cruz to draw a meaningful comparison of labor market outcomes of
obese individuals before and after passage of its weight-discrimination law.
102. More formally, the triple-difference estimate is computed using the following equation:
Y=Xi3+oyl+Jy2 +PY3 +(O*J)y4 +(O*P)Ys+(J*P)Y 6 +(O*]*P)y7 +TT+e. Here, Y,
X, 0, J, and T are defined in the same manner as before. See supra note 93. The only new variable to
the above equation is P, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation comes from any
year after the jurisdiction of interest passed a weight-discrimination law. The coefficient of interest, 'Y 7
is the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate.
103. The number of observations used to estimate Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are reported in Appendix
Table 1.
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Madison, Urbana, Binghamton, and Prince George's County all have the
highest rates of employment for wages in their respective jurisdictions.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the percentage of the
population in the labor market (i.e., employed for wages, self-employed, or
out of work) in the ten jurisdictions and their surrounding states. While
rates of employment for wages measure how successful individuals are in
finding and keeping a job, rates of labor market participation measure how
encouraged individuals feel about their prospects of finding and keeping a
job. If an individual's labor market prospects become too grim-perhaps
because the individual has repeatedly tried, but failed, to get a job-the
individual may become a "discouraged worker."'a A discouraged worker
is someone who is willing to work but has stopped looking for a job (and
has exited the labor market) because of inability to find a job. 10 5 Comparing
labor market participation rates by BMI classification can reveal whether
heavier workers are less discouraged about their prospects of obtaining a
job in jurisdictions with weight and personal appearance laws.
According to Table 3, overweight men generally have the highest rates
of labor market participation, while underweight and normal weight
women tend to have the highest rates of labor market participation. As in
Table 2, however, there are exceptions to this general rule. Obese men in
Madison, Urbana, Santa Cruz, and Harford County and obese women in
Madison, Binghamton, Santa Cruz, and Prince George's County all have
the highest rates of labor market participation in their respective
jurisdictions. Although the summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3 indicate
that heavier individuals in jurisdictions with weight-discrimination laws
may fare better in the labor market than heavier individuals in jurisdictions
without such laws, the summary statistics do not control for the role of
other observable characteristics. Any observable differences in labor
market participation and employment rates for heavier individuals within
the ten jurisdictions may not be driven by the presence of a weight or
personal appearance law. They may instead be driven by systematic
differences in these individuals' education, experience, or other
demographic characteristics.
The regression analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5 control for any
systematic differences in demographic characteristics in order to determine
whether labor market outcomes of heavier individuals in the ten
jurisdictions are positively influenced by the presence of a local weight/
personal appearance law. Table 4 presents the difference-in-differences
estimates, which compare labor market outcomes of overweight and obese

104. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/1fcharacteristics.htm.

105.

Id.
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individuals to the labor market outcomes of underweight and normal
weight individuals, both inside and outside the ten jurisdictions. 106 The
results vary widely between jurisdictions.
In one jurisdiction, Michigan, heavier men and women have worse
labor market outcomes than the heavier men and women in bordering states
without such legal protections. Despite offering the only statewide
prohibition against weight discrimination, the Michigan law appears to
have decreased labor market participation of obese men by 2.6 percentage
points and decreased employment for wages of obese men by 2.5
percentage points. In four other jurisdictions-San Francisco and the three
Maryland counties-weight discrimination laws have not impacted either
labor market participation or employment for wages of obese men and
women.
. In three jurisdictions-Washington,
D.C., Santa Cruz, and
Binghamton-the results are mixed. The three laws seem to have improved
the labor market outcomes of obese men, but they have not improved labor
market outcomes of obese women. Indeed, in Washington, D.C. and Santa
Cruz, the laws have negatively impacted the rates of labor market
participation and the rates of employment for wages of obese women. Only
in two jurisdictions, Madison and Urbana, have weight/personal
appearance laws universally improved labor market outcomes of heavier
men and women. The estimates of these laws' impacts on labor market
participation and employment for wages are all positive, and in general, are
also statistically significant. For obese women in Madison, for example, the
local weight/personal appearance law has improved their rate of
employment for wages by 9.5 percentage points. Obese women in Urbana
have seen a 12.8 percentage point increase in their rate of employment for
wages.
Table 5 serves as a robustness check for the main analysis in Table 4.
Table 4, which presents the double-difference, compares labor market
outcomes of the obese to the non-obese, inside and outside jurisdictions
with a weight/personal appearance law, using only observations from after
the passage of each jurisdiction's weight/personal appearance law. 10 7 But
for two cities, San Francisco and Binghamton, the BRFSS data contains
observations that pre-date these cities' passage of their weightdiscrimination laws. Thus, for these cities, I can go a step further and

106. The results reported here compare labor market outcomes within the ten jurisdictions to
labor market outcomes in the surrounding states. For a description of robustness checks run comparing
the protected jurisdictions to surrounding counties and to surrounding similarly sized cities within the
state, see supra note 94.
107. See supra note 97 (describing how the double-difference estimates for Santa Cruz, San
Francisco, and Binghamton (presented in Table 4) do not use the full range of 1985-2012 BRFSS data
since their weight/personal appearance laws passed after 1985).
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compare the labor market outcomes of the obese to the non-obese, inside
and outside jurisdictions with a weight/personal appearance law, before
and after passage of the law. The results of this triple-difference estimation
are presented in Table 5.
The triple-difference estimates for San Francisco and Binghamton
presented in Table 5 are very similar to the double-difference estimates for
these cities in Table 4. Once again, the San Francisco law appears to have
had little impact on the labor market outcomes of overweight and obese
individuals, and the Binghamton law seems to have helped overweight and
obese men (but not women). The similarity of the triple-difference results
in Table 5 to the double-difference results in Table 4 suggest that the
double-difference results are reliable estimates of the laws' labor market
effects.'s
In sum, the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that only two of
the weight discrimination laws have had universally positive effects for
heavier individuals of both genders. The laws in Madison and Urbana have
improved both the rate of employment for wages and the rate of labor
market participation for overweight and obese individuals of both genders.
Meanwhile, the laws in Binghamton, Santa Cruz, and Washington, D.C.
have had mixed outcomes, and the other five laws have not improved
anyone's labor market outcomes. The next Part will look to differences in
administration and enforcement of the ten laws in order to explain why
some of these laws are more successful than others.
TV. ENFORCEMENT: THE SECRET BEHIND THE SUCCESS
Determining why some of these laws have been more effective thati
others requires going beyond the empirical results presented in the previous
Part. Thinking back to the differences between the laws discussed in Part
III, the jurisdictions with the most successful laws, Madison and Urbana,
are also the only two jurisdictions whose laws do not create a private right
of action. Individuals seeking a remedy for weight discrimination in
Madison and Urbana must go through local commission processes; they

108. Triple-difference estimates help to address the concern that these ten jurisdictions were
already systematically different from their surrounding states before they passed weight/personal
appearance laws. If heavier workers in these ten jurisdictions already had different labor market
outcomes than heavier workers in surrounding states, then the double-difference estimates would pick
up these pre-existing systematic differences. But by differencing out observations from before passage
of a weight/personal appearance law, the triple-difference analysis allows us to compare labor market
outcomes of the obese to the non-obese both before and after passage of a weight/personal appearance
law within a jurisdiction of interest. Since here the triple-difference estimates in Table 5 for San
Francisco and Binghamton are quite similar to the double-difference estimates in Table 4, the tripledifference estimates assure us that the double-difference estimates are picking up the labor market
effects of the weight/personal appearance law (as opposed to some pre-existing, systematic difference).
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cannot sue their employer directly in court. 109 Although it might be
tempting to conclude from this evidence that commission processes are
always more effective than the court system, such reasoning fails to explain
why other jurisdictions with commission processes fail to achieve the same
positive results as Madison and Urbana.
Looking beyond the obvious differences, four key elements stand out
about the most successful commissions. First, the most effective
commissions require respondent employers to sit down and discuss the
alleged discriminatory act(s) with the complainant in mediation. Second,
the most effective commissions make it easy for a complainant to pursue
her discrimination claim without the assistance of an attorney. Third, the
most effective commissions provide for swift administration and quick
resolution of discrimination disputes. Fourth, the most effective
commissions work to promote awareness of the laws they administer
among local residents and employers. Each element is reviewed in turn.
A.

Mandatory Mediation

With the exception of Binghamton, 110 nine jurisdictions offer mediation
programs, which all have the goal of achieving a mutually satisfactory
resolution of discrimination disputes between complainants and respondent
employers in an expedient and cost-effective manner."' The local human
rights commissions cover the costs of mediation in eight of the nine
jurisdictions; only one jurisdiction, Santa Cruz, requires the parties to the
dispute to share the costs of mediation.1 12 Yet, the majority of these local
mediation programs are optional; as long as one party refuses to participate
in mediation, the parties are never forced to sit down and attempt to resolve
their dispute.
Nonetheless, Madison, Urbana, Washington, D.C., and Santa Cruz all
require the parties to go to mediation as part of their commission
processes.113 Of course, either party can refuse to cooperate at mediation
and make it a complete waste of time for everyone involved. But it appears
that, on balance, forcing the parties to sit down with each other increases a
local antidiscrimination law's efficacy, given that all four jurisdictions with
mandatory mediation programs have seen some improvement in labor
market outcomes of the obese. Madison and Urbana, of course, have seen

109.
110.
city is still
111.
112.
113.

See supra PartIII.A.
Binghamton may begin offering a mediation program in the near future, but for now, the
in the process of ramping up its new Human Rights Commission.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
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improvement in labor market outcomes for heavier workers of both
genders, while Washington, D.C. and Santa Cruz have seen improvements
for heavier men.
The idea that mandatory mediation may be a more effective policy than
optional mediation is not a revolutionary one.1 14 Over the past decade,
several legal commentators have noted that "[h]istorically, voluntary
mediation programs have not been well attended.""' Of course, the same
commentators worry about the costs associated with mandating mediation
when one or more parties refuse to compromise or even to discuss the
dispute.1 16 Still, the observed value of having adversarial parties sit down
with each other towards the beginning of a dispute has recently led a New
York judicial task force to recommend a mandatory mediation program for
the Manhattan Supreme Court.1 17 Although it remains unclear whether
mandatory mediation is advisable for all types of disputes, for employment
discrimination disputes, at least, mandatory mediation appears to be an
important tool in increasing a law's efficacy.
B. FacilitatingSelf-Representation
It is no secret that bringing an employment discrimination claim in the
court system can be quite complex, both procedurally and substantively,
and thus not very conducive to proceeding pro se.11 As a result, the most
successful local comnuission processes are the ones that facilitate selfrepresentation. Enabling plaintiffs to proceed pro se mitigates the common
concern that "[f]ack of legal representation may inhibit discriminatees'
success in pursuing meritorious claims, particularly when the employer is
represented." 19 Four of the ten jurisdictions-Madison, Urbana,
114.

See, e.g., Green, supra note 2 (arguing that the current EEOC enforcement scheme should

be replaced by requiring the parties to an employment discrimination charge to attend mandatory
mediation).

115. Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and
Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 327, 329 (2003); see also Ari Davis, Moving from Mandatory:
Making ADR Voluntary in New York Commercial Division Cases, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.

283, 295 (2006); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, What Do Disputants Want? Preferences
for Third Party Resolution Procedures, 28 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. Sci. 130, 130 (1996); Donna
Shestowsky, The Psychology of ProceduralPreference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex

Ante, 99 IOWA L. REv. 637, 675 (2014); Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to
Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.

69, 79 (2001).
116.
117.

Zylstra, supra note 115, at 80.
Jacob Gershman, A Manhattan Experiment in Mandatory Mediation, WALL ST. J.: L BLOG

(Jan. 30, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2014/01/30/a-manhattan-experiment-in-mandatorymediation/.
118.

See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of

Employment-DiscriminationClaims, 46 U. OF MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 801, 830-31 (2013).
119. Id.at80l.
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Washington, D.C., and Prince George's County-excel in empowering
plaintiffs to proceed through their commission processes without
representation by a private attorney.
In Madison, the local commission does everything possible to help
complainants represent themselves effectively. On its website, the Madison
commission maintains a thorough and easily searchable decision digest so
that complainants can look up previous cases similar to their own.120 The
commission also provides complainants with extensive instructions on
every step of the commission process, including how to gather evidence,
prepare witnesses, and present their cases at a hearing. 121 If at any point in
the process, the complainant decides that she wants assistance in the prehearing negotiations and the actual hearing, the Madison commission
allows the complainant to bring anyone to help represent her-including a
non-lawyer. Moreover, if the complainant prefers to have a private
attorney, the Madison commission provides a list of attorneys who have
litigation experience with the Madison antidiscrimination ordinance. 122
Washington, D.C., like Madison, offers complainants a great deal of
free support throughout its commission process. The D.C. Office of Human
Rights does not require-or even expect-that complainants utilizing the
commission process be represented by an attorney. As a result, the Office
of Human Rights similarly provides extensive instructions for complainants
on the hearing process (although, unlike Madison, Washington, D.C. does
not provide complainants with a digest of previous decisions). 123 Moreover,
the D.C. Office of Human Rights will appoint an attorney for complainants
without private representation who reach a full commission hearing. 12 4
In Washington, D.C. and Madison, the local commissions have sought
to bolster complainants' ability to proceed without private representation.
by giving them the tools to present their own cases in an effective manner.
In contrast, Urbana's commission process is structured so that the need for
private representation never arises. The Urbana Human Relations Officer
and one other staff member investigate all discrimination claims filed with
the local commission. If the human relations officer finds that a claim has
probable cause, the case proceeds to conciliation, where the human
relations officer's role transforms from neutral investigator into that of a

120.

See

Equal

Opportunities

Commission,

CITY

OF

MADISON,

http://www.cityofimadison.com/dcr/commeoc.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
121. Id.
122. E-mail from Madison Equal Opportunities Commission to author (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file
with author).
123. D.C. OFFICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A GUIDE TO THE D.C. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS'
PROCESS
(2015),
http://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publication/
ADJUDICATION

attachments/Commission%20Litigation%2OManual_0.pdf.
124. Id.
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"law enforcement" officer.1 25 Although the human relations officer
officially acts as an advocate for the people of Urbana, he also acts as an
inadvertent advocate for the complainant once probable cause is found.
During conciliation, the human relations officer seeks full relief for the
complainant. 12 6 If conciliation fails and the case proceeds to a commission
hearing, the human relations officer becomes the prosecutor-presenting
the entire case against the respondent employer. Because the human
relations officer is responsible for gathering and presenting all the evidence
against the respondent employer, there is never any need for the
complainant to have a private attorney.1 27
Prince George's County has a very similar process to the Urbana
process. Once the executive director issues a decision of "cause" after
investigating a discrimination complaint, he assumes the role of direct
advocate for the people of Prince George's County and the role of indirect
advocate for the complainant. Moreover, if the case proceeds to a
commission hearing, the executive director is solely responsible for
prosecuting the case.1 28 Even when the executive director issues a decision
of "no cause" after investigating a discrimination complaint, and the
complainant decides to appeal the decision, the complainant can easily
represent herself. According to the current executive director, the
"Commissioners go out of their way to allow the Complainant to present
[her] case."1 29
Even though the remaining jurisdictions offer local enforcement
commission processes as alternatives to the courtroom, none of these
jurisdictions offer the same level of support for pro se litigants that
Madison, Washington, D.C., Urbana, and Prince George's County offer.
Recall that the commissions in Santa Cruz and Harford County only
provide mediation and conciliation assistance.1 3 0 They do not provide a
public hearing before appointed commissioners if conciliation fails. As a
result, discrimination victims in these cities may still have to file a lawsuit
in order to gain relief under the local weight/personal appearance laws.
Any complainants who have to file a lawsuit will miss out on the cost
savings (not to mention the ease of proceeding pro se) that a full
commission process can provide.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Telephone Interview with Todd Rent, supranote 87.
Id.
Id.
E-mail from Michael Lyles to author, supranote 75.
Id.
See infra Appendix Subparts E, H.
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In Michigan, although the Department of Civil Rights provides
complainants with a brochure outlining the complaint process,131 the
department does nothing to help complainants who make it to a full
commission hearing--despite the fact that a full hearing operates much like
a courtroom trial (with the complainant responsible for presenting
evidence, examining witnesses, and adhering to the rules of evidence in the
presentation of her case).1 3 2 The limited support offered to pro se
complainants by the Michigan department is particularly striking given
that, according to the former director of the department's Office of Legal
Affairs, "the majority of people using the Department process do not retain
counsel due to financial concerns." 33
Like Michigan, San Francisco fails to provide complainants utilizing its
commission process with much support along the way. San Francisco
offers little guidance for complainants beyond the probable cause
determination stage, even though the final stage of the commission process
is conducted in a manner similar to a trial (with the complainant
responsible for presenting her own case).1 34 As a result, complainants often
decide to retain private counsel as they navigate the commission process.
To illustrate, the San Francisco Human Rights Commission has records of
three settlements resulting from complaints filed with the commission
under the city's weight discrimination law. In two of these three cases, the
complainants were represented by a private attorney. 135
Like in San Francisco and Michigan, complainants proceeding through
the commission process in Howard County do not fare well without the
assistance of an attorney. According to the Compliance Officer for the
Howard County Office of Human Rights, "it's pretty difficult" for a
complainant to represent herself, especially once the case proceeds to a full

131.

MICH.

DEP'T OF

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

COMPLAINT

INVESTIGATION

PROCESS

(2011),

http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/complaintprocessbroc4-12-10_1_317648_7.pdf
132. E-mail from Sylvia J. Elliott, Former Dir., Office of Legal Affairs, Mich. Dep't of Civil
Rights, to author (Jan. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
133. Id.
134.
Housing,

See San Francisco Human Rights Commission, How to File a Complaint in Employment,
and Public Accommodation,
CITY
&
COUNTY
OF
S.F.,
http://www.sf-

hrc.org/index.aspx?page=85 (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
135. E-mail from Mullane Ahern, Contract Compliance Officer, S.F. Human Rights Comm'n, to
author (Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with author). Both cases in which the complainants hired counsel
received national attention. The first complaint was filed by Krissy Keefer, a dancer whose eight-yearold daughter was rejected by the San Francisco Ballet School for "not hav[ing] the right body type." Jon
Carroll, Just Like a Ballerina, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 2000, at C24. The second complaint was filed by
Jennifer Portnick, an aerobics instructor who was rejected from teaching Jazzercise because of her
weight. Elizabeth Femadez, Teacher Says Fat, Fitness Can Mix: S.F. Mediates Complaint Jazzercise

Showed Bias, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2002, at A2 1. Both Portnick and Keefer were represented by the
same local employment discrimination attorney, Sondra Solovay. Telephone Interview with Sondra
Solovay, Weight Discrimination Attorney, S.F. (Aug. 17, 2011).
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commission hearing. 13 6 Not only must complainants adhere to the rules of
evidence at a full commission hearing, but they are also responsible for
"pre-hearing filing requirements that would be difficult to satisfy without
the help of an attorney."l 37 In sum, not all commission processes are
supportive of complainants who wish to proceed pro se; indeed, some
processes are quite unsupportive. The original purpose for establishing
many of these commissions was to enable discrimination victims to avoid
the long wait times and high costs often associated with federal
employment discrimination lawsuits. 13 8 Commissions that make selfrepresentation too difficult for discrimination victims defeat this original
purpose.
C. Swift Adjudication
Commissions that take too long to administer and to adjudicate
discrimination claims also defeat the original purpose for their
establishment. And yet long wait times plague some local commissions.
Prince George's County averages approximately 200 days to investigate a
claim and to make a reasonable cause determination.1 3 9 Although this
average is shorter than the federal EEOC average,1 40 further delays await
complainants who continue the commission process in Prince George's
County. Complainants whose cases go to a full commission hearing may
wait up to six months for a decision-so by the time that a complainant
completes the investigation, conciliation, and hearing processes, years have
likely passed. 14 1 In nearby Howard County, the Office of Human Rights is
mandated by law to complete its investigation and cause determination
within 180 days. 142 But no such time limits bind the Human Rights
Commission; as a result, "the cases age and get very, very old" waiting for
their public hearings. 14 3 Thus, if conciliation fails, and a case is set for
public hearing, complainants face a long delay until final resolution.

136. Telephone Interview with Mary Campbell, Compliance Officer, Howard Cty., Md. Office
of Human Rights (Oct. 11, 2013).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., infra Appendix Subpart E (citing the EEOC's long wait times and the high costs
of federal employment discrimination litigation as principal legislative motivations behind the Harford
County ordinance); see also Maurice E. R. Munroe, supra note 2, at 260-61 (discussing how the EEOC
has had a problematic "backlog" of cases since its inception).
139. E-mail from Michael Lyles to author, supranote 75.
140.

According to one district director, EEOC complaint investigation time averages about a

year. Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, Dist. Dir. of Memphis Office, Equal Emp't
Opportunity Commission (Jan. 9, 2012).
141. E-mail from Michael Lyles to author, supranote 75.
142.

Telephone Interview with Mary Campbell, supranote 136.

143.

Id.
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Perhaps the local commission with the longest delays, however, is
Michigan. Michigan's statute does not place any time limits on the
Department of Civil Rights to administer discrimination complaints. 1" As a
result, complainants pursuing the Michigan commission process face
waiting times that rival the federal process. Interestingly, the delays in
Michigan are not the result of too many complaints going through the
entire process to full commission hearing-the Civil Rights Commission
has only decided seventeen cases since 2000.145 Nonetheless, in the last
case decided by the commission, the complainant had started the
commission process eight years before.14 6 For the previous four cases
decided by the commission, the complainant had started the commission
process two to four years prior. 147
In sharp contrast, the commissions with the shortest wait times are
often the ones bound by law to adhere to a strict time frame. The Urbana
Human Relations Commission is bound by the strictest time constraints.
There, the executivedirector has forty-two days to issue a probable cause
decision; 14 8 the parties then have another forty-two days to reach a
conciliation agreement.1 4 9 If the parties do not reach an agreement, then a
public hearing is scheduled before the full Commission within 105 days.so
Similarly, in Washington, D.C., the Office of Human Rights must schedule
mediation within two weeks of a complaint filing; the office must issue a
probable cause determination within five weeks.' 5
The Madison Equal Opportunities Commission also processes
complaints quickly, although its process times are not legally mandated.
Instead, the quick processing times of the Madison Commission are due to
how well the office is staffed. Unlike many other local commission offices,
which have sufficient resources to employ only one or two people to
investigate and administer complaints, the Madison Commission has over a

144. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2605 (2013).
145. E-mail from Sylvia J. Elliott to author, supranote 132.
146. See Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights ex rel Barash v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'1 Transp.,
Case No. 325610 (Mich. Civil Rights Comm'n May 21, 2012) (final order),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/DECISIONpkt_387246_7.pdf.
147.
See Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, Commission Decisions, MICHIGAN.GOV,
http://www.michigan.gov/mdcr/0,1607,7-138-47782_47828_48067-,00.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2016).
148. URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-82(b) (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 2016-03025).
149. Id. § 12-83(d).
150. Id.
151. D.C. Office of Human Rights, Employment, Education and Public Accommodation
Complaints: What to Expect, DC.GOV, http://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publication/
attachments/EmploymentFlowChart.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
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$1,000,000 budget,1 52 allowing it to employ fourteen people. 15 3 As a result,
even Madison Commission decisions that are appealed all the way up to the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals are generally resolved within three years from
the date the complaint was first filed. 154 The speed with which Madison,
Washington, D.C., and Urbana adjudicate discrimination claims provides
yet another reason why these jurisdictions have all seen some positive
impact from their antidiscrimination laws.
D. Awareness
A final element-general awareness of the law by the local
community-may help explain why the laws in Madison and Urbana have
been the most successful, while the laws in other jurisdictions have had
mixed results at best. The relatively well-staffed and well-funded Madison
Equal Opportunities Commission provides extensive education and
outreach services to the local community, including free literature for
employees about their legal rights, free diversity training seminars for both
employees and employers, and free consultations with employers regarding
compliance with Madison antidiscrimination laws.155 In turn, the Madison
commission receives approximately seventy employment discrimination
complaints each year. 15 6
Although the Urbana Human Relations Commission does not enjoy the
same level of funding seen in Madison-Urbana's administrative office has
only a director, a human relations officer, and another part-time staff
member-the Urbana commission does enjoy a similar general awareness
of its presence in the community. According to the current human relations
officer, his office has "a very active enforcement mechanism and [a]
reputation of being thorough."157 This reputation combines with a "level of
awareness [that is] greater than in most communities" about the city's
strong human rights law, resulting in employers who take the Urbana

152. City of Madison Fin. Dep't, Adopted 2014 Operating Budget: Civil Rights, CITY OF
http://www.cityofinadison.com/finance/documents/2Ol4OpBud/Adopted/022-oper04.pdf
MADISON,
(last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
153.
City of Madison Dep't of Civil Rights, Staff Directory, CIrY OF MADISON,
https://www.cityofnadison.com/dcr/aboutStaff.cfin (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); see also E-mail from
Lucia Nunez, Madison Dep't of Civil Rights Dir., to author (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with author).
154.
City of Madison Dep't of Civil Rights, Decision Digest, CITY OF MADISON,
http://www.cityofmadison.com/dcr/DecisionDigest/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
155.
See City of Madison Dep't of Civil Rights, Brochures,
CITY OF MADISON,
http://www.cityofinadison.com/dcr/resourcesBrochures.cfn#DRbro (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
156. Madison received seventy-six employment complaints in 2011 and seventy complaints in
2010. Of course, not all of these complaints were based on personal appearance. E-mail from Rachel
Campbell, Admin. Clerk for the Madison Equal Opportunities Comm'n, to author (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file
with author).
157. Telephone Interview with Todd Rent, surpa note 87.
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ordinance very seriously.158 Interestingly, the human relations officer points
to the fact that the commission has not had a public hearing on a complaint
in five years despite receiving five to six new complaints per month as
evidence of how seriously employers take their office.1 59 Once his office
makes a determination of probable cause, employers know it is in their best
interest to resolve the dispute.1 60
Similarly, Binghamton appears to enjoy a great deal of community
awareness regarding its weight-discrimination law-despite only recently
establishing its Human Rights Commission. Much of this awareness likely
stems from the strong legislative support for human rights legislation in the
city since 2008. The measure to establish the new Human Rights
Commission, for instance, unanimously passed the Binghamton City
Council in late 2011.161 Once all seven voting members had been appointed
in January 2013, the new commission almost immediately started its public
advocacy. In March of 2013, for example, after CVS Caremark issued a
new policy requiring employees to begin reporting and monitoring their
weight,1 6 2 the commission sent a notice to the corporation to rescind its
policy with respect to employees in Binghamton, as the policy violated the
local human rights law.' 63 The Commission also actively maintains a
Facebook page, where it posts updates on its current activities and human
rights interest stories from around the globe.164
In contrast, lack of awareness about local human rights protection
stands in the way of efficacy for many jurisdictions. In Santa Cruz, which
requires that individuals file a complaint with Santa Cruz Human
Resources before filing suit,' 65 the local human rights ordinance appears to
have been completely forgotten by residents. An interview with Joe
McMullen, the Chief Human Resources Officer of Santa Cruz, revealed
that only two complaints have ever been filed since the human rights
ordinance was passed in 1992.166 Neither complaint involved weight or
personal appearance discrimination. One of the complaints was
immediately dropped; the other complaint involved a homosexual couple

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161.
City Approves Human Rights Commission, WBNG NEWS, (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://www.wbng.com/news/local/City-Approves-Human-Rights-Commission-135217813.html.
162. Amy Langfield, CVS to Workers: Tell Us How Much You Weigh or It'll Cost You $600 a
Year, NBCNEWS, (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100573805.
163. E-mail from Sean G. Massey to author, supra note 84.
164.

See

Greater

Binghamton

Human

Rights,

FACEBOOK,

http://www.facebook.com/BinghamtonHRC (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
165. See infra Part H of the Appendix.
166. Telephone Interview with Joe McMullen, Chief Human Res. Officer of Santa Cruz, Cal.
(Jan. 9, 2011).
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who was refused a room at a local motel. 167 Once Santa Cruz Human
Resources notified the motel owner of the complaint, the motel owner
agreed to attend sensitivity training, and the couple dropped their
complaint. 168
In other jurisdictions, lack of awareness about personal appearance and
weight protections specifically stands in the way of efficacy. Given the
publicity surrounding the passage of San Francisco's weight-discrimination
law, awareness does not seem like it should be a problem there. But a 2006
study commissioned by the San Francisco Human Rights Commission
concluded otherwise. After conducting a survey of local residents and
employers, the study concluded that the Human Rights Commission failed
to promote public awareness of the weight-discrimination ordinance and
actively failed to enforce the ordinance.169 As a result, the study
concluded-much as this Article has concluded-that "San Francisco's
public policy to prohibit weight discrimination is not effective in
preventing weight based discrimination."l 7 0
In Washington, D.C. and Prince George's County, the lack of
awareness about weight and personal appearance protections appears to
extend all the way to the local enforcement offices. When contacted, the
General Counsel of the Washington, D.C. Office of Human Rights knew
almost nothing about its personal appearance law, including when or why
the law was passed. The general counsel also did not know of any
complaints that had ever been filed under the law.' 71 Thus, while the
Washington, D.C. commission process may be effective for some forms of
discrimination, personal appearance discrimination seems to have been
forgotten by its Office of Human Rights. 172 In Prince George's County, the
Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission was aware of the
personal appearance statute, but he believed that the protections against

167.
168.

Id.
Id.

169. CATHERINE M. WIPPEL, SAN FRANCISCO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE CHAPTERS 12A, 12B AND
12C AND SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAIJPOLICE CODE ARTICLE 33: AN EVALUATION OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S PUBLIC POLICY TO PROHIBIT WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION 4 (Dec. 21, 2006), 2000 Human
Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San Francisco, Cal., Human Rights Commission Office).

170. Id. at 16-17.
171. Telephone Interview with Alexis P. Taylor, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Office of Human Rights
(Aug. 14, 2011).
172. After I contacted the General Counsel, the General Counsel assigned a staff member to
research the law because she knew so little about it. The staff member was unable to find anything

about the law in the Office of Human Rights records. Id.; E-mail from Jewell Little, Staff Attorney,
D.C. Office of Human Rights, to author (Sep. 7, 2011) (on file with author); E-mail from Jewell Little,
Staff Attorney, D.C. Office of Human Rights, to author (Jan. 3, 2012) (on file with author). The
legislative history presented in Part F of the Appendix is solely the result of independent research from
newspaper articles and from an interview with Sterling Tucker, the Chairman of the DC Council that

passed the 1977 Human Rights Ordinance.
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personal appearance discrimination should be applied only to hairstyle and
clothing, and not weight, given the legislative history of the statute. 173 He
did admit, however, that the statute had been extended past its original
legislative intent to cover transgendered individuals. Moreover, the office
had previously handled a complaint that included weight as part of a
personal appearance discrimination claim. 174
In sum, the success of a local antidiscrimination law at improving
employment outcomes of the obese is no accident. Without swift
administration and an active enforcement commission, obese workers who
experience discrimination are left with a remedy that feels unsatisfactory
and not worth the wait. Over time, such unsatisfactory remedies lead these
local antidiscrimination laws to be ignored and forgotten-by both
employers and protected individuals.
V. CONCLUSION

Broadening from the local to the federal level, employment
discrimination law faces a difficult predicament. Advocacy groups clamor
to expand civil rights protections beyond race, color, national origin, sex,
religion, age, and disability. Yet the law is having a difficult time aiding
these seven, already protected classes due to the realities of enforcement
(or lack thereof). In the end, no one is satisfied with the state of federal
employment discrimination law. And as this study has shown, the same
predicament can exist at the state and local level as well. Even in
jurisdictions with expansive discrimination protections-so expansive that
they protect weight and personal appearance-the law on the books may
not match the law in action.
The goal of this study was to identify the enforcement mechanisms that
could end this mismatch in employment discrimination law. By taking
advantage of variations in state and local laws' protections of weight and
personal appearance discrimination, a combination of quantitative and
qualitative methods allowed for a natural experiment to identify the critical
mechanisms. Some of the mechanisms identified here were not surprising:
the importance of equipping enforcement agencies with resources,
monetary or otherwise, is already well-known.175 But this study also
pointed to requiring party mediation, facilitating self-representation, and

173.
ordinance
traditional
174.
175.

E-mail from Michael Lyles to author, supra note 75. Recall from Part III.A that the
was originally passed to protect African-Americans who wore natural hairstyles and
African clothing.
Id.
See, e.g., Koppel, supranote 1; Vogel, supranote 1.
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raising public awareness as critical components of an effective
discrimination enforcement regime.
Yet other mechanisms identified here were surprising. For instance, the
two most effective local laws came from jurisdictions that did not provide
aggrieved parties with private rights of action. This result suggests that in
the context of employment discrimination, it may not matter whether the
enforcement is administrative or adjudicative in nature, as long as it is
swift, cheap, and easy to access. Equally surprising is that a law's efficacy
seems to bear little relation to its underlying motivations for passage and
legislative purpose. At the outset, it would have been natural to predict that
San Francisco's or Michigan's law would have resulted in the greatest
impact on obese individuals, given that these laws were specifically passed
to protect their rights. And yet, we see the most effective laws coming from
jurisdictions where weight was an add-on to a law that was initially
motivated by concern for the rights of racial minorities and the LGBT
community. The failure of the San Francisco and Michigan laws further
reinforces how much administrative mechanisms matter.
In the employment discrimination context, two laws that protect the
same personal characteristic-whether that characteristic be race, sex, or
something else like weight-are not always created equal. Certainly, each
law's statutory language and legislative history can influence how
successfully the law advances civil rights. But statutory language and
legislative history do not appear to be as crucial as enforcement, whether
that enforcement is directed towards extending the law's original purpose
or towards a broader purpose not originally considered by the drafters.
Moreover, effective administration of discrimination laws does not require
providing plaintiffs with more than one method of enforcing their rights; as
the Madison and Urbana cases demonstrate, it does not even require
providing plaintiffs with an adjudicative remedy. Administrative remedies
can actually be more plaintiff-friendly, and as a result, more effective in
bringing about the intended legislative effect of combatting labor market
discrimination. In other words, in the employment discrimination context,
less can be more.
Although the principal focus of this study has been obese workers, the
lessons learned in this Article seem particularly salient for LGBT
advocates. Almost half of U.S. states now ban discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and/or gender identity, and most of these bans have
passed within the last decade.176 In light of these legislative successes-not

176.

Washington, D.C. and seventeen states ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation

and sexual identity. See Non-Discrimination Map, supra note 17. Four other states ban discrimination

on the basis of sexual orientation only. Id.
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to mention the recent Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges17 7 -it
may be tempting for leaders of the LGBT movement to claim victory and
focus entirely on passing new laws in the remaining states without
employment discrimination bans. But the story of weight discrimination
laws provides a cautionary tale against such tactics. Without strong
enforcement mechanisms that allow victims to seek a remedy for
discrimination in a swift and cost-effective manner, antidiscrimination laws
on the books carry little weight, and the law in action becomes little more
than law inaction.

177.

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Table 2. Percent Employed for Wages in Ten Jurisdictions and Their
Surrounding Areas, by BMI Classification
Men

Women

Underweight/
Normal
Weight

Overweight

Obese

Underweight/
Normal
Weight

Overweight

Obese

Michigan

49.34

50.68*

46.95*

44.22

40.22*

40.07*

Bordering
States

52.76

54.27*

51.40*

47.38

43.60*

43.51*

Washington,
D.C.
Bordering
States

57.27

57.53

52.39*

53.59

49.67*

46.07*

57.03

58.90*

57.17

50.73

47.72*

47.98*

Madison
Rest of
Wisconsin

58.97

61.94

59.16

59.37

57.74

60.58

54.92

55.91

54.04

52.07

48.18*

48.39*

Urbana

56.25

58.17

61.21

41.43

47.03

47.71

Rest of
Illinois

57.06

57.82

56.74

49.59

45.93*

46.29*

Binghamton

46.67

51.70

47.14

40.88

37.07

46.39

53.59*

51.99

48.44

45.05*

44.17*

Rest of New
Rof
w
York

51.14
______

__________

___

Santa Cruz

39.86

47.98

60.00*

39.86

32.64

38.60

Sancs
Francisco
Rest of
California

49.13

47.51

48.95

43.92

40.41

38.30

49.04

52.19*

50.88*

41.43

38.65*

38.35*

Howard
County

66.01

67.14

67.73

58.86

53.54

57.44

Harford

57.85

61.66

62.61

52.81

49.42

49.21

61.30

64.76

62.75

57.65

58.95

59.12

County
Prince

George's

County
Rest of
51.08
47.88*
47.92*
56.75
58.21*
56.27
Rest ofd
MarylandI
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents ages 18 to 65 from the 1985-2012 BRFSS data. Santa
Cruz estimates use only the 1993-2012 data, San Francisco estimates use only the 2001-2012 data,
and Binghamton estimates use only the 2009-2012 data. The number of observations for each cell are
reported in Appendix Table 1. The employed for wages variable counts respondents who are
employed for wages as employed, and all other respondents as unemployed. An asterisk (*) indicates
a significant difference in the sample mean at the 5% level between the normal-weight group and the
BMI classification group of interest. Sample excludes pregnant women.
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Table 3. Percent in the Labor Market in Ten Jurisdictions and Their
Surrounding Areas, by BMI Classification
Women

Men
Underweight/
Normal

Overweight

Obese

Weight

Underweight/
Normal
Weight
55.19

Overweight

Obese

50.19*

50.72*

57.70

53.34*

53.78*

Michigan
Bordering
States

65.46

66.31

63.22*

68.83

70.02*

67.51*

Washington,
D.C.
Bordering
States

73.40

73.90

69.88*

66.99

62.45*

59.50*

70.90

73.16*

71.40

60.65

57.25*

57.87*

Madison
Rest of
Wistconn
Wisconsin

73.40

78.22

79.10

68.82

67.55

72.02

71.53

72.73

71.14

62.71

58.31*

59.01*

__

__

67.61

66.35

68.97

51.71

58.42

54.25

72.43

73.97*

72.52

59.73

55.40*

56.77*

Binghamton
Rest of New
York

61.33

63.63

58.57

49.64

45.69

57.83

70.96

72.10

69.59

61.26

55.75*

55.06*

Santa Cruz
San Francisco
Rest of
California

68.84
72.32

72.25
72.95

78.67
72.63

57.73
61.00

54.17
56.27

57.89
50.64*

69.82

73.19*

71.46*

56.34

52.92*

52.41*

Howard
County
Has-ford
County

78.66

80.50

79.80

69.54

64.90

69.34

69.68

73.65

74.77

61.84

58.48

61.71

74.15

76.93

76.89

66.83

68.24

69.13

Urbana
Rest of
Illinois

Prince
George's
County

Rest of

57.86*
58.40*
73.19*
71.33
61.56
Mast ld
71.19
MarylandI
I
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The labor market variable counts respondents who are employed for
wages, self-employed, and out of work as in the labor market, and all other respondents as not in the
labor market. An asterisk (*) indicates a significant difference in the sample mean at the 5% level
between the normal-weight group and the BMI classification group of interest. Sample excludes
pregnant women.
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Table 4. Double-Difference Regressions Comparing Labor Market
Outcomes of Overweight and Obese Workers in Ten Jurisdictions to
Surrounding States
Men
Women
In the Labor
Employed
In the
Employed
Market
for Wages
Labor
for Wages
Market
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)

Michigan

MI*Overweight
MI*Obese

-0.005
(0.008)
-0.026**
(0.008)

0.009
(0.010)
-0.025*
(0.011)

-0.023*
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.010)

-0.006
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.010)

0.013
(0.009)
0.014
(0.010)

0.035**
(0.013)
0.018
(0.013)

-0.021+
(0.012)
-0.029*
(0.013)

-0.005
(0.014)
-0.038**
(0.014)

0.083**
(0.029)
0.105**
(0.034)

0.078+
(0.039)
0.060
(0.044)

0.017
(0.021)
0.094**
(0.027)

0.029
(0.026)
0.095**
(0.030)

0.066
(0.054)
0.167**
(0.052)

0.085
(0.063)
0.201**
(0.054)

0.082*
(0.038)
0.050
(0.058)

0.035
(0.041)
0.128*
(0.059)

0.140**
(0.045)
0.239*
(0.103)

0.080*
(0.039)
0.209**
(0.048)

0.025
(0.070)
-0.031
(0.090)

-0.043
(0.181)
0.077
(0.109)

0.080
(0.070)
0.105+
(0.058)

-0.024
(0.067)
0.176**
(0.062)

-0.010
(0.078)
-0.109+
(0.068)

0.028
(0.113)
-0.171**
(0.065)

0.039
(0.034)
0.072+
(0.038)

0.036
(0.050)
0.122
(0.083)

0.002
(0.030)
-0.011
(0.056)

-0.046
(0.045)
0.001
(0.076)

0.028+
(0.017)

0.009

-0.019

(0.024)

(0.024)

-0.036
(0.029)

Washington, D.C.

D.C.*Overweight
D.C.*Obese
Madison
Madison*
Overweight
Madison*Obese
Urbana
Urbana______

Urbana*Overweight
Urbana*Obese
Binghamton

Binghamton*
Overweight
Binghamton*Obese
Santa Cruz

SC*Overweight
SC*Obese
San Francisco
SF*Overweight
SF*Obese
Howard County

Howard*Overweight
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Howard*Obese
Harford County
Harford*Overweight
Harford*Obese

0.009
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(0.021)

0.032
(0.026)

0.014
(0.033)

-0.063
(0.055)

0.009
(0.029)
-0.010
(0.037)

0.011
(0.034)
0.021
(0.044)

-0.030
(0.020)
0.069*
(0.027)

-0.010
(0.022)
0.028
(0.045)

0.013
(0.020)
0.016
(0.017)

0.031
(0.023)
0.004
(0.018)

Prince George's
County

PG*Overweight
PG*Obese

0.019
0.060*
(0.017)
(0.027)
0.026
0.035
(0.017)
(0.025)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Notes: Reported estimates are from a linear probability regression using respondents in the
labor market ages 18 to 65 from the 1985-2012 BRFSS data. Santa Cruz estimates use only
the 1993-2012 data, San Francisco estimates use only the 2001-2012 data, and Binghamton
estimates use only the 2009-2012 data. The number of observations for each cell are
reported in Appendix Table 1. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state
and year are below in parentheses. All estimates are weighted using the BRFSS sample
weights. Column headings are the dependent variable for each regression. The employed for
wages dependent variable counts respondents who are employed for wages as employed,
and all other respondents as unemployed. The labor market dependent variable counts
respondents who are employed for wages, self-employed, and out of work as in the labor
market, and all other respondents as not in the labor market. Underweight/normal weight
individuals are the omitted category in these estimates. All regressions include year
dummies as well as controls for education level, age, age squared, marital status, AfricanAmerican. Hispanic. and other races. Sample excludes preanant women.
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Table 5. Triple-Difference Regressions Comparing Labor Market
Outcomes of Overweight and Obese Workers in Binghamton and San
Francisco to Surrounding States, Before and After Passage of a Weight/
Personal Appearance Law
Men
In the Labor
Employed
Market
for Wages
San Francisco
SF*Overweight
SF*Obese
Binghamton
Binghamton*Over
weight
Binghamton*Obese

Women
In the Labor
Employed for
Wages
Market

(3)

(4)

(1)

(2)

-0.066
(0.058)
0.089
(0.074)

0.006
(0.075)
0.199
(0.126)

0.010
(0.069)
-0.165*
(0.077)

0.001
(0.071)
-0.081
(0.142)

0.192*
(0.081)
0.465**
(0.110)
** p<0.01, *

0.111
(0.072)
0.381**
(0.075)
p<0.05, + p<O.1

0.023
(0.126)
0.036
(0.141)

-0.071
(0.192)
0.130
(0.159)

Notes: Reported estimates are from a linear probability regression using respondents in the
labor market ages 18 to 65 from the 1985-2012 BRFSS data. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered by state and year are below in parentheses. All estimates are
weighted using the BRFSS sample weights. Column headings are the dependent variable for
each regression. The employed for wages dependent variable counts respondents who are
employed for wages as employed, and all other respondents as unemployed. The labor market
dependent variable counts respondents who are employed for wages, self-employed, and out
of work as in the labor market, and all other respondents as not in the labor market.
Underweight/normal weight individuals are the omitted category in these estimates. All
regressions include year dummies as well as controls for education level, age, age squared,
marital status, African-American, Hispanic, and other races. Sample excludes pregnant
women.
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APPENDIX: WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAWS THAT
PROHIBIT IT

A brief account of the unique legislative histories, methods of
administration, and enforcement mechanisms of all ten weight and personal
appearance discrimination laws is detailed below.
A.

Prince George's County, Maryland

The first wave of these laws emerged in the 1970s, long before obesity
rates began to rise nationwide. Prince George's County, Maryland was the
first mover, passing its law that prohibits personal appearance
discrimination in 1972. Understanding why Prince George's County was
the first jurisdiction in the United States to pass such a law requires
understanding the changing nature of this area during the early 1970s. The
early 1970s marked a period of substantial migration out of urban
Washington, D.C., and into the nearby suburbs. Migrants of all races
moved out of the city, although, where the migrants settled was generally
segregated by race. Prince George's County soon became a popular choice
among African-American families because of its affordability and its
proximity to the African-American neighborhoods of D.C."'
As a result, the racial composition of the county changed rapidly.
During the period from 1970 to 1980, Prince George's African-American
population grew by 188.7%; in just a decade, African-Americans went
from only 14% of the county's population to 37% of the population. 179 At
the same time, the county's white population declined by 30% due to white
flight.180 The rapidly changing racial composition soon led to clashes
between whites and African-Americans in the county. In 1971, a group of
African-American residents together with the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed suit in federal court to end
the de facto segregation that still endured in the Prince George's County
schools181 almost twenty years after Brown v. Board ofEducation.'82
At the same time, disputes escalated between whites and AfricanAmericans regarding discrimination in employment and housing. The most
frequent complaints were from African-Americans who wore their hair in
natural styles, cornrows, or dreadlocks, as well as from those who wore

178. See VALERIE C. JOHNSON, BLACK POWER IN THE SUBURBS: THE MYTH OR REALITY OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN SUBURBAN POLITICAL INCORPORATION 37-42 (2002) (discussing migration
patterns into Prince George's County during the 1970s).
179. Id. at 39.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3-4, 109. This lawsuit resulted in a federal court order to desegregate in 1972.
182. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of... personal appearance; ....

"

traditional African garments.1 83 As a result, "personal appearance" was
included in the first bill of the 1972 Prince George's County Council
session as part of a sweeping human rights ordinance. 184 Sponsored by two
white Prince George's County Councilmen, Ronald Reeder (a Republican)
and Francis Francois (a Democrat), the bill had the express intent that "all
persons should exercise and enjoy all civil, economic, political and housing
rights without interference and without discrimination because
Codified today as Prince George's County Code § 2-185 et seq., the
ordinance does not specifically mention weight in its definition of personal
appearance.1 8 6 Still, claimants seeking relief for any type of personal
appearance discrimination have the option of pursuing a private action or
going through a local commission process.187 If the claimant chooses to
pursue a private action, then she may file her complaint directly in the
Prince George's County Circuit Court. There is no exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement. 88
Because filing a private action generally necessitates the assistance of
an attorney, however, many claimants instead choose to file a claim with
the Prince George's Human Relations Commission. 89 After a complaint is
filed with the commission, assigned investigators look into the allegations
and turn over their findings to the Executive Director. The Executive
Director then issues a decision of "cause" or "no cause." 90 If the Executive
Director finds no cause, the complainant can appeal the finding to the full
commission (comprised of thirteen members appointed by the County
Executive).191 If the Executive Director finds cause, however, the case
proceeds to mandatory conciliation, and if conciliation fails, the case
proceeds to a de novo hearing before the full commission.192
At the hearing, the Executive Director prosecutes the case on behalf of
the people of Prince George's County, and the complainant serves as the
Director's chief witness.1 93 Once the commission renders a decision, the

183. E-mail from Michael Lyles, supra note 75.
184. A Bill Entitled: Human Relations Commission, CB-1-1972, Prince George's Cty. Council
(Feb. 15, 1972).
185. Id.
186.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES

§ 2-186(14)

(LEXIS through CB-

29-2016).
187. Id. § 2-200.
188. Id.
189. Note that complainants must choose either a private action or the commission process; they
cannot pursue both processes simultaneously. E-mail from Michael Lyles to author, supranote 81.
190. Id.
19 1. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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decision. is appealable by both the complainant and the respondent
employer to the Prince George's County Circuit Court.1 94 Successful
claimants may be awarded injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory
damages, back pay, and "humiliation and embarrassment" damages of up
to $200,000.'9' Unsuccessful respondents may also face a civil fine of up to
The procedures and remedies available under the Prince

$10,000.196

George's County ordinance, along with the procedures and remedies
available under the other nine local laws, are summarized in Table 1.
B. Howard County, Maryland
Two additional laws passed in 1975, one of which came from another
Maryland county. Howard County, which borders Baltimore County, was a
largely agricultural area until the late 1960s, when it too was reshaped by
the suburban migration movement. 19 7 Beginning in 1962, real estate
developer James Rouse began buying parcels of land with the hopes of
creating a "new city"-which would later become Columbia, Maryland
(now the seat of Howard County government). 198 Together with a team of
urban planners, Rouse assembled a detailed strategy to build an
"economically diverse, polycultural, multi-faith and inter-racial" city
between Baltimore and Washington, D.C. 199 As soon as the first residential
complex was completed in 1967,20 liberally minded migrants began
flocking to the new city, which soon created tension with the county's
preexisting, more conservative residents. 20 1 By 1974, Columbia residents
comprised most of the Howard County population, leading to the election
of five progressive Democrats to fill the county council seats.202
Concern over "a backlog of civil rights cases on the state and federal
level" led the newly elected council members to consider expanding local
human rights protections.20 3 The goal of the ordinance, proposed by
Councilman Richard L. Anderson, was (1) to create a local commission

194.

2016).
195.
196.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES

Id.
Id.

§§

§ 2-197

(LEXIS through CB-29-

2-195, 2-195.01.
County's

197. Howard

HOWARD

History,

COUNTY,

MD.,

https://www.howardcountymd.gov/About-HoCo/History (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
198. History

of

Columbia,

COLUMBIA

ASS'N,

https://www.columbiaassociation.org/

facilities/columbia-archives/digital-resources/history-of-columbia/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
199. Id.; see also Nate Sandstrom, Is Rouse Still Right?, COLUMBIA FLIER, Nov. 29, 2007.
200. Id.
201.

Telephone Interview with C. Vernon Gray, supra note 99.

202.

Id.

203.

Michael J. Clark, Howard Rights Commission Campaignsfor More Power, THE SUN, Apr.

16, 1975, at C2.
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that had similar authority to state and federal agencies, and (2) to provide
protection for individuals not covered by state and federal laws, including
those who faced discrimination because of their personal appearance. 204
Like the Prince George's County Council members, Howard County
Council members were concerned that discrimination on the basis of
personal appearance constituted another form of racial discrimination. But
Howard County Council members were also concerned about
discrimination against men with long hair,2 05 which had been the subject of
a well-publicized, local dispute between A&P Supermarket and one of its
former employees in 197 1.206
The ordinance eventually passed in 1975 and is codified today as
Howard County Code § 12.200 et seq. It states that "[d]iscrimination
practices based upon . .. [p]ersonal appearance . .. are contrary to the

public policy of Howard County." 207 Personal appearance, according to the
statutory definition, includes "outward appearance of a person with regard
to hair style, facial hair, physical characteristics or manner of dress." 20 8 All
claimants seeking relief for personal appearance discrimination must file a
charge with the Howard County Office of Human Rights, which initiates a
local administrative action. After a forty-five day waiting period,
complainants are also free to file a private action in Howard County Circuit
Court; complainants who choose to file a civil suit need not drop their
Office of Human Rights administrative action.2 09
After a charge is filed, the administrative action begins with an
investigation by the assigned Office of Human Rights staff member,
culminating in the staff member's determination of whether "reasonable
cause to believe the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination"
21
exists.210 If the staff member finds no reasonable cause, the Office of
Human Rights dismisses the complaint; the complainant then has the right
to appeal the dismissal to the Howard County Human Rights Commission,
a twelve-member volunteer panel appointed by the County council.211 If the
staff member finds reasonable cause, the case proceeds to mandatory

204. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with C. Vernon Gray, supra note 99.
206. The former produce clerk for A&P claimed that the supermarket chain suspended him when
he refused to cut his hair. See Michael J. Clark, Rights Panel HearsA. &P. Ex-Clerk Argue HairLength,
BALT. SUN, Sept. 22, 1971, at C14.
207.
HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.200(1) (LEXIS through Ordinance
No. 20-2016).
208. Id. § 12.201(XV).
209. Id. § 12.202(IX)(i); Telephone Interview with Mary Campbell, supranote 136.
210. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.202(IX)(c) (LEXIS).
211. Telephone Interview with Mary Campbell, supra note 136.
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conciliation, and if conciliation fails, then the case proceeds to a de novo
hearing before the Human Rights Commission.2 12
In this hearing, the assigned Office of Human Rights staff member, the
complainant, and the respondent all put on a case. Among the remedies that
the Commission (and the Circuit Court) can grant to the complainant are
injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory damages, back pay, and
attorney fees.2 13 Both the complainant and the respondent have thirty days
to appeal the final administrative decision of the Human Rights
Commission to the Howard County Circuit Court.2 14
C. Madison, Wisconsin
In the same year that the Howard County personal appearance law
passed, a similar local ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
physical appearance passed in Madison, Wisconsin. Although Madison was
hundreds of miles away from Howard County, similar concerns convinced
the city's Common Council members to adopt the ordinance in 1975. In
particular, council members were concerned about "[e]mployers' and
landlords' biases concerning hair length and facial hair, married versus
unmarried persons, styles of dress and sexual orientation." 215 As a result,
when the council passed the ordinance on March 13, 1975, a local
newspaper2 16 article praised it as "one of the strongest ordinances in the
country."

Codified today as Madison General Ordinances § 39.03(1), the law
mandates the "practice of providing equal opportunities in housing,
employment, public accommodations and City facilities . . to persons
without regard to . .. physical appearance." 2 17 Moreover, the ordinance
specifically defines physical appearance to include "weight." 2 18 To seek
relief under the ordinance, discrimination victims must file a complaint
with the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, which administers and
adjudicates the claim. The ordinance does not provide complainants with a
private right of action; they must seek relief through the local
administrative process.2 19
For each complaint, the commission assigns an investigator to the case,
whose task is to look into the evidence and, eventually, to issue a decision
212. Id.

§

213.

HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. § 12.212(V)(a).
Equal OpportunityReport, CAP. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1975, at 24.
Id.
MADISON, WIS., GEN. ORDINANCES § 39.03(1) (2015).
Id. § 39.03(2).
Id. § 39.02(9)(i).

12.212(IV)(j) (LEXIS).
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as to whether probable cause exists.220 A determination of no probable
cause is appealable to the commission. A determination of probable cause,
however, sends the case to conciliation. If conciliation fails, the case then
proceeds to a hearing on the merits in front of a hearing examiner.2 21 The
complainant and respondent both present evidence at this hearing; the
investigator does not participate. After this hearing, the examiner issues an
order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the investigator
finds that discrimination occurred, the order will also mandate remedies, 222
which can include economic damages, noneconomic damages, front pay,
and back pay.223 Both the complainant and the respondent have a right of
appeal to the full five-member commission, which reviews only the hearing
record.2 24 After the commission appeal, either party may further appeal the
decision to the Dane County Circuit Court, and afterward, to the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals.225
D. Michigan
Only a year after the Madison and Howard County laws came the law
in the state of Michigan. Unlike its predecessors, the Michigan law was the
first local law explicitly concerned with weight-based discrimination. The
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act guarantees the "opportunity to obtain
employment, housing and other real estate, and the full and equal
utilization of public accommodations, public service, and educational
facilities without discrimination because of. . . weight." 226 Weight was
added to Michigan's civil rights legislation through the efforts of an
innovative legislator, State Representative Thomas Mathieu. Mathieu, a
former grassroots organizer, was somewhat ahead of his time in
recognizing that weight could present a problem in the workplace,
particularly for women. According to Mathieu, he pushed for the addition
of weight

220.

See City of Madison Dep't of Civil Rights, Equal Opportunities Division, Outline of

Complaint Process,

CITY

OF

MADISON

(Aug.

22,

2012),

http://www.cityofmadison.com/

dcr/documents/Outline.pdf (providing a thorough overview of the MEOC administrative process).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. MADISON, WIs., GEN. ORDINANCES § 39.03(10)(c)(2)(b).
224. Equal Opportunities Division, Madison Dep't of Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 2.
225.

Id. For examples of Madison Equal Opportunities Commission cases that have been

appealed, see Sam's Club, Inc. v. Madison Equal Opportunities Comm'n, No. 02-2024, 2013 WL
21707207 (Wis. Ct. App. July 4, 2003); State ex rel. McDonald's v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n of
Madison, No. 830157, 1984 WL 180623 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1984); FederatedRural Electric Ins.
Corp. v. Madison Equal Opportunities Comm'n, No. 79-538, 1981 WL 138689 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 27,
1981).
226. MICH. CoMP. LAWS. § 37.2102(1) (2013).
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because of my personal observations while working for the
Community Action program in Grand Rapids. I saw with my own
eyes how people lost out on job opportunities, just because of the
way they looked. [To] be blunt-too fat or too short.
In that work, before running and being elected to Michigan
Legislature, I was deeply moved by the persons who had suffered
such job rejections, simply because of the way they looked. Mostly
it was overweight females, women with superb clerical and
secretarial skills, clearly well qualified for the position but rejected
out of hand because they didn't fit the employer's desire of a
Playboy Centerfold body to parade around the office.227
In order to seek a remedy under the Michigan Act today, weightdiscrimination complainants have a choice: they can file a private action in
state court, or they can instead utilize the administrative process of the
Michigan Civil Rights Department.228 Complainants who choose the
administrative process must file a complaint within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act (in contrast, complainants who choose to file a private
lawsuit have three years). 22 9 The complaint then proceeds to the
investigation phase, which terminates once the department determines
whether sufficient evidence exists to issue a charge of discrimination. 2 3 0 If
the department does not issue a charge, the complainant may file a written
reconsideration request. If the department does issue a charge, the case
proceeds to conciliation. If the parties do not settle during conciliation, the
final step is an administrative hearing before the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, comprised of eight appointed members. 23 1
If successful, claimants under the Michigan law are entitled to
injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory damages, back pay, and
attorney fees (regardless of whether they choose to pursue a private lawsuit
or the department process). Furthermore, the respondent employer is
subject to a civil fine of up to $50,000.232 Claimants who bring a private
action can appeal a lower court's decision, of course, through the Michigan
state court system. Claimants who choose the Department process can
227.

228.

E-mail from Thomas C. Mathieu, supra note 74.

There is no exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement before a weight-

discrimination plaintiff can file in state court. MDCR Jurisdiction, 2014, MICH. DEP'T OF C.R.,

http://www.michigan.gov/mdcr/0,4613,7-138-42240_43561-153172-,00.html
2016).
229. Id.
230.

MICH. DEP'T OF CIvu

(last visited Sept. 13,

RIGHTS, RULES GOVERNING ORGANIZATION, PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE (2011), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/pamphlet commissionrules_7786_7.pdf.
23 1. Id.
232. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2603-2605 (2013).
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appeal the commission's hearing decision to the Ingham County Circuit
Court and then up through the Michigan state court appellate system.233
E. Harford County, Maryland
Like Howard County, Harford County borders Baltimore County and
also experienced significant inward migration during the 1970s. In fact,
from 1970 to 1980, Harford's total population increased by more than
20%.234 With the changing population came changes in the political
landscape, resulting in the election of the first African-American to the
Harford County Council in 1974.235 Dr. Leham Spry, a local dentist, beat
the incumbent councilman by more than 2,000 votes, despite the fact that
only 8% of the county was African-American.2 36 As the former president of
the Harford County Chapter of the NAACP,2 37 Spry was quick to sponsor a
comprehensive bill to strengthen the civil rights protections within the
county.
In 1976, Councilman Spry sponsored Bill 76-81, which established a
new administrative process through the city's volunteer Human Relations
Commission and extended antidiscrimination protections to eleven
characteristics-including six characteristics beyond the five already
protected by Title VII. 23 8 Among these additional six characteristics was
personal appearance. 2 3 9 At the hearing on the bill, testimony emphasized
the two-year backlog of discrimination cases at the Maryland Commission
on Civil Rights and at the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), concluding that it was "more practical and
economical to have local agencies handle these cases., 24 0 Testimony
further praised the proposed bill as "all encompassing." 24 1 The bill passed
five-to-two later that evening. 24 2

233.

Id.

§ 37.2606.

234. Maryland Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Mar. 27, 1995), http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/mdl90090.txt.
235. Dr. Leham Spry Wins HarfordCounty Seat, BALT. AFRO-AMERICAN, Dec. 7, 1974, at 28.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Harford Cty. Council, Bill No. 76-81, 1976 Council, Legis. Day No. 76-30 (Md. 1976) (an
act to repeal Section 229 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Harford County),
http://www5.harfordcountymd.gov/WebLink8/0/doc/9575/Page3.aspx.
239. Id.
240. Proceedings of Public Hearings: Hearingon Bill No. 76-81, Harford Cty. Council, Legis.
Day No. 76-33, at 46 (Md. 1976) (statement of Freida Mauldin, Md. Ass'n of Human Rights Agency)
(on
file
with
Harford
Cty.,
Md.,
Council),
http://www5.harfordcountymd.gov/
WebLink8/0/doc/3312/Page29.aspx.
241.

Id. at 47 (statement of Thomas Barranger, Chairman on the Human Relations Comm'n).

242.

Id. at 51.
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Since the enactment of Bill 76-81, Harford County Code § 95-1 has
"assured equal protection of the law . .. and due process of the law with
respect to education, housing, administration of justice, employment,
public accommodations, government services and other related
fields . . without discrimination because of .. . personal appearance." 24 3 In
order to seek a remedy for personal appearance discrimination,
complainants have the option of filing a private action directly in Harford
County Circuit Court or filing a complaint with the Harford County Office
of Human Relations. 24 Currently, the Harford County Office has only one
paid manager; the rest of the staff is comprised of a voluntary advisory
board. 24 5 As a result, the administrative process is more limited. If the
office determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination occurred, the claimant and respondent are invited to
conciliate. But if conciliation fails, the complainant's only option is to file
suit in Harford County Circuit Court-there is no administrative hearing
process.24 6 Remedies available under the ordinance for successful
complainants include injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory
damages, and attorney fees. 2 47 In addition, respondents who have violated
the ordinance are subject to a $1,000 civil penalty.24 8
F. Washington, Districtof Columbia
The next law came a year later in Washington, D.C., although the story
had begun almost four years previously. Since World War II, the city had
unsuccessfully fought Congress for home rule. At last, in the 1967
Reorganization Act, Congress granted D.C. limited home rule, with a ninemember council and a commissioner all appointed by the U.S. President.24 9
Even though the council was not popularly elected, by August of 1973, it
had passed a revolutionary law banning discrimination on the basis of
personal
appearance
in
employment,
housing,
and
public
accommodation. 2 50 The council was concerned that groups like "single

243.

HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE

§ 95-1

(1978).

244.
A complainant can directly file a complaint in circuit court; there is no exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement. E-mail from Sylvia W. Bryant, Manager, Harford Cty., Md.

Office of Human Relations, to author (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with author).
245. Id. The office did not have a paid manager until fiscal year 2012; beginning fiscal year
2013, the office also retained an administrative assistant. See, e.g., DAVID R. CRAIG, HARFORD
COUNTY, MARYLAND APPROVED ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013-2014 (2013),
http://www.harfordcountymd.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/360.

246.

E-mail from Sylvia W. Bryant to author, supranote 244.

247.

HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CODE

§ 95-13.

248. Id. § 95-14.
249. See 40 U.S.C. § 8303 (2012).
250. Editorial, The City's Moves to ProtectHuman Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1973, at A20.
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people, students and longhairs . . ha[d] encountered barriers that have no
real bearing on their character, reliability or public behavior." 2 5 1 The
council was also concerned that in this "Northern town with Southern
exposure," discriminating on the basis of personal appearance might serve
as a clever excuse for Southerners in D.C. to discriminate on the basis of
race.252
The law was short-lived, however; on December 24, 1973, Congress
passed the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, granting D.C. full home
rule. 2 5 3 An elected mayor and a thirteen-member, "very activist" council
took office for the first time on January 1, 1975, ready to start from scratch
and "to correct the wrongs of many years." 2 54 Under the leadership of
Chairman Sterling Tucker, the council passed a new Human Rights
Ordinance in 1977. The new ordinance was intended to be an "expansion of
the 1973 Act," protecting everything from "dashikis" to "bushes, . . . long
beards, [and] long hair." 25 5 Like the 1973 ordinance, the 1977 ordinance
barred all discrimination on the basis of personal appearance.
The definition of personal appearance in D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(22)
does not specifically include "weight," but it broadly includes the "outward
appearance of any person, irrespective of sex, with regard to bodily
condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner or style
of personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and
beards."256 In order to seek relief under the D.C. ordinance today,
complainants have a choice of pursuing a private lawsuit or an
administrative action through the D.C. Office of Human Rights.257
Individuals pursuing the former avenue of relief can directly file a lawsuit
(D.C. has no exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement).25 8
Individuals pursuing the latter avenue must file a complaint with the D.C.
Office of Human Rights. After investigating the complaint, the D.C.
Office-like many of the other local offices-makes a determination
whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent has violated
the Human Rights Ordinance. If the Office makes a determination of no

251.

Editorial, Improvement ofLocal Human Rights Protections, WASH. POST, May 28, 1973, at

A26.
252. Telephone Interview with Sterling Tucker, supranote 75.
253. See District Court of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774
(1973).
254. Telephone Interview with Sterling Tucker, supranote 75.
255. Id.
256. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(22) (2001).
257. See id. § 2-1403.16. For a recent weight discrimination case filed under the D.C. Act, see
Ivey v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 607 (D.C. 2008); Ivey v. District of Columbia, 46 A.3d 1101
(D.C. 2012).
258. See D.C. CODE § 2-1403.16.
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probable cause, the complaint is dismissed, and the complainant has fifteen
days to appeal to the Office of Human Rights.259
If the office makes a determination of probable cause, however, the
case proceeds to conciliation and, whenever conciliation fails, onto a
commission hearing. A commission hearing in D.C. takes place before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and a panel of three appointed Human
Rights Commissioners (D.C. has thirteen Commissioners total).
Commission review at the hearing is de novo (i.e., the Office of Human
Rights' findings are not given any weight), and both complainants and
respondents must present evidence in support of their positions as in any
trial.26 0 After the hearing, the ALJ compiles the record and issues a
recommended decision to the three commissioners, which they can either
accept or reject. The panel of commissioners issues a final decision and
remedies (if appropriate), which can include injunctive and equitable relief,
compensatory damages, back pay, attorney fees, and a civil fine of up to
$50,000.261 Either party can appeal the panel's decision to the D.C. Court
of Appeals.262
G. Urbana, Illinois
The final law of the 1970s came at the end of the decade from Urbana,
Illinois. Urbana Code of Ordinances § 12-37 prohibits "discrimination by
reason of . .. personal appearance . .. or any other discrimination based

upon categorizing or classifying a person rather than evaluating a person's
unique qualifications relevant to an opportunity in housing, employment,
credit or access to public accommodations." 2 63 The ordinance specifically
defines personal appearance to include "weight."264 Urbana's Human
Rights Law came after almost a decade of wrangling among the mayor and
city council members.
The history of the provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
personal appearance is intertwined with the history of another provision in
the 1979 Urbana ordinance that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. The Gay Liberation Front (GLF) was very active in the
area throughout the 1970s, staging protests in both Urbana and its sister

259.

See

Office

of

Human

Rights,

Complaint Process

&

Timeline,

DC.GOV,

http://ohr.dc.gov/complaints/process (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
260.
See Office of Human Rights, DC Commission on Human Rights, DC.GOV,
http://ohr.dc.gov/commission (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
261. See D.C. CODE § 2-1403.13.
262. See id.
263. URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-37 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 2016-03025).
264. See id. § 12-39.
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city, Champaign. Perhaps the GLF's best known local leader was
University of Illinois student, Jeff Graubart. Graubart's appeals to local
politicians led to the repeal of both Champaign and Urbana's anti-crossdressing laws in 1971 and 1972, respectively.
Desiring additional civil rights protections, however, Graubart and the
other members of the GLF continued their activism after the repeal of these
laws. On April 15, 1972, while Graubart and other GLF members were
staging a protest of an Urbana bar that was openly hostile to the LGBT
community, they were assaulted by individuals unsympathetic to their
cause. 25 Even though the Urbana police failed to apprehend the assailants,
a GLF member spotted one of them on campus on April 25, 1972.266
Graubart called the. police, and the police arrested the individual.
Nevertheless, when Graubart and another GLF member went into the
police station to give a statement, the arresting officer accused them of
lying to the police. The police officer held the two in custody for over an
hour, threatening them for "defaming" an "All-American Boy" and
subjecting them to a series of homophobic slurs.267
Graubart contacted the District Attorney's office about the incident, but
the office refused to launch an investigation. Emotionally distraught,
Graubart dropped out of school and moved to Chicago and later to
California. But Graubart continued to be haunted by "the horrors of April
15th, 1972" and the subsequent denial of justice.26 8 Thus, in 1976, Graubart
determined to return to Urbana and seek recompense for the 1972 events.
On March 2, 1976, Graubart began a sit-in at Urbana City Hall. 2 69 At the
same time, he issued a press release demanding one million dollars in
damages, full funding for him to finish his education, and reimbursement
for the psychiatric and medical bills he had accrued as a result of the
incident.270
The protest ended unsuccessfully-police arrested Graubart after
seventeen days of camping out in City Hall. Even though Graubart did not
receive the personal damages he sought, he did succeed in bringing public
attention to his situation and to the situation of the entire LGBT community
in Urbana. He also caught the attention of an Urbana city councilman. In
1973, Dr. John Peterson, a well-known community organizer, became the
first independent elected to the Urbana City Council. As the "outsider" on
265.

See Student Life and Culture Archives, UNiv. OF ILL. ARCHIVES,

http://archives.library.illinois.edu/slc/files/2014/08/SLC-panels-1870s-2010s3.pdf [hereinafter UNIV. OF
ILL. ARCHIvEs] (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
266. See Press Release, Jeffrey Graubart, supra note 77.
267. Id. at 2.
268. Id. at 5.
269.

See UNIV. OF ILL. ARCHIVES, supra note 265.

270.

See Press Release, Jeffrey Graubart, supra note 77.
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the council, Peterson had successfully sponsored a human rights ordinance
in 1975 that gave limited protections to the LGBT community. 271 However,
the 1975 ordinance did not provide protection against housing
discrimination, which was an important issue in a university town. The
compromise required to avoid a mayoral veto of the 1975 ordinance also
resulted in provisions of limited investigatory powers if a complaint was
filed and mild remedies if a complaint was successful.27 2
Peterson seized the opportunity to take advantage of the public
discontent after Graubart's sit-in as well as the fact that, as of 1977,
Democrats held a ten-to-four majority on the Urbana City Council, making
the council veto-proof. Over the next year and a half, Peterson worked with
members of the Urbana Human Rights Commission, Graubart, and other
members of the LGBT community to draft a new ordinance. This ordinance
would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in all facets
of life with stronger enforcement powers and stiffer penalties. Still, some
Democrats on the council were wary of voting for a purely LGBT rights
bill. According to Graubart,
personal
palatable
because
motive

appearance was added as a way to make the bill more
to the homophobes. We were against inclusion, not
we supported such discrimination, but because their
was to hide the fact that it was an LGBT

ordinance.

...

[We were] disturbed when they move[d] to add a

laundry list of people who should not be discriminated against. 27 3
Such a laundry list was necessary, however, to get the ordinance passed.
Over two years after Graubart's sit-in, the Urbana Human Rights Law was
signed into law on May 10, 1979.274
In order to recover for personal appearance discrimination under the
Urbana act, discrimination victims must file a complaint with the local
administrative authority, the Human Relations Commission. The Urbana
Human Relations Officer and one other staff member investigate all claims.
If they find that the claim has probable cause, the claim proceeds to
conciliation, and if conciliation has been unsuccessful after a 42-day
period, the claim is slated for a public hearing in front of the entire eight-

271.

Telephone Interview with Dr. John Peterson, supra note 77.

272.
Marilyn Upah-Bant, Urbana Commission Eyes Champaign's Rights Law, URBANA
COURIER, Nov. 16, 1977, at 3; Commission Seeks New Human Rights Ordinance, URBANA COURIER,

Jan. 19, 1978, at 4.
273. E-mail from Jeffrey Graubart to author (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
274. E-mail from Todd Rent, Urbana, Ill. Human Relations Officer, to author (Nov. 14, 2011)
(on file with author).
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member Human Relations Commission within the next 105-day period.275
No private right of action exists under the Urbana Human Rights
Ordinance.276 Successful claimants may obtain injunctive and equitable
relief, compensatory damages, and back pay. The Human Relations
Commission may additionally order an employer respondent to pay up to a
$500 civil fine.277 At the conclusion of the commission hearing, either party
may appeal the commission's decision to the Sixth Judicial Circuit of
Illinois.27 8
H. Santa Cruz, Calfornia
After the passage of the Urbana ordinance, the passage of weight and
personal-appearance discrimination ordinances ceased for over a decade.
Indeed, the next ordinance did not emerge until 1992 in Santa Cruz,
California. Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 9.83.010 "safeguard[s] the right
and opportunity of all persons to be free from all forms. of arbitrary
discrimination, including discrimination based on . .. weight or physical
characteristic."279 Sponsored by Councilman Neal Coonerty,2 8 0 the 1992
ordinance had origins similar to the 1979 Urbana ordinance. Weight and
physical characteristics became add-ons to what began as an LGBT
discrimination ordinance.
The initial push for the ordinance came after former California
Governor Pete Wilson vetoed a law that would have prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation throughout the state.281
Enraged by the veto, local LGBT activists knew that they would need a
broader base of support to get an ordinance successfully passed in Santa
Cruz. As a result, they formed a coalition with local women's rights and fat
rights advocates to push for a new law "to protect more of the nonmainstream." 2 82 As in Urbana, public support for a strictly LGBT ordinance
was not universal; many outraged citizens wrote letters to the Santa Cruz

275.
276.
277.
03-025).
278.

Telephone Interview with Todd Rent, supra note 87.
Id.
See URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-101 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 2016See id.

§§

12-84, 12-102.

§ 9.83.010
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SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE

280.

E-mail from Ryan Coonerty, Former Mayor, Santa Cruz, Cal., to author (July 30, 2011) (on

(1995).

file with author).

281. Myers, supra note 81.
282. Id. The most prominent organizations joining LGBT advocates included the Body Image
Task Force, the National Organization of Women, and the Woman's International League for Peace and
Freedom. See Correspondence Folder for Ordinance 92-11 (1992) (on file with Santa Cruz, Cal. City
Clerk Office).
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Council in opposition.283 Weight and physical characteristics became
successful distractions from the principal issue, LGBT rights. These
distractions rallied support from council members who initially opposed the
ordinance, and the revised ordinance passed the council on February 11,
1992.284

In order to recover under the Santa Cruz ordinance, weight
discrimination victims must first file a claim with the Santa Cruz Human
Resources Department. The Chief Human Resources Officer conducts a
preliminary investigation of the complaint, contacts the accused party for a
response, and requests that the accused party attend mediation with the
complainant.2 85 If the accused party accepts the mediation proposal, the
officer turns over the results of the preliminary investigation to the
mediator, and the parties attempt to settle.286 If the parties do not settle,
then the complainant can file a private action. Similarly, if the accused
party refuses to go to mediation, the complainant can file a private
action.2 87 Courts can award injunctive relief, equitable relief, compensatory
damages, and attorney fees to weight discrimination victims under this
ordinance.288 Courts may also order employers found in violation of the
ordinance to pay a civil fine of up to $500.289
L

San Francisco, California

The next ordinance came from the state of California as well. For San
Francisco, a self-described "city of tolerance,"290 it all started in 1999 with
a billboard. A California-based chain of health clubs, 24 Hour Fitness,
unveiled its new "sci-fi" advertising campaign in mid-February of 1999
with a prominent South of Market billboard depicting an alien and the
message, "When they come, they'll eat the fat ones first." 29 1 Within days,
local fat rights activists had organized a protest. About thirty protestors
dressed as aliens stood outside one 24 Hour Fitness location on a Sunday

283.
284.
285.
9, 2011).
286.
287.

Id.
See Myers, supra note 81.
Telephone Interview with Joe McMullen, Chief Human Res. Officer, Santa Cruz, Cal. (Jan.
Id.
Id.

288.
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289.

Id.

§ 9.83.120

(1995).

290. See Edward Epstein, Fat People Get a Positive Hearing in S.F.: Supervisors Set Vote on
ProtectedStatus, S.F. CHRON., May 4, 2000, at Al.

291. Ulysses Torassa, Persons of Heft Protest Health Club's Ad Saying Space Aliens Would
Gobble Up Fat Folks, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 16, 1999, at Al; Edward Epstein & Ken Hoover, Ammiano
Takes Aim at Fat Bias: Supervisor Wants Laws to Cover Hefty Individuals, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1999,
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morning doing aerobics as they held signs saying "Eat me," "I'mYummy,"
and "Bite My Fat Alien Butt." 292
Even though the protest was small, it caught the attention of local
newspapers, and more importantly, the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors. Within a week, Supervisor Tom Ammiano had addressed the
Board, the city attorney, and the San Francisco Human Rights Commission
about adding "weight and body size" to the city's human rights
ordinance.293 By the end of February, the Human Rights Commission had
sent a letter to 24 Hour Fitness asking the health club chain to remove the
billboard because it "target[ed] people for their appearance," and "similar
jokes about minorities or gays would not be tolerated" in the city of San
Francisco.2 94
Although the Board's letter was unsuccessful-24 Hour Fitness refused
to remove the billboard-the issue of body size discrimination remained in
the spotlight. One staff member of the Commission noted that the publicity
surrounding the Board's letter drew "a lot of support" because "[p]eople
really responded on this issue as one of fairness to all people."295
Consequently, the Human Rights Commission approved a resolution on
body size discrimination at their meeting on June 10, 1999 that encouraged
"the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor to enact legislation adding 'body
size' or a comparable phrase to San Francisco's antidiscrimination
ordinances" and encouraged "all City contractors, and all businesses and
agencies in San Francisco, to eliminate body size discrimination from their
,,296
programs and policies.
After receiving the commission's resolution, the Board of Supervisors
spent almost a year considering the possibility of adding body size
language to the city's Human Rights Ordinance. On March 20, 2000,
Supervisor Tom Ammiano introduced an ordinance that banned "the
practice

of

discrimination

on

the . .. grounds

of... weight"

employment, city contracts, public accommodations, and

housing. 297

in

The

292. Torassa, supranote 82.
293. See Epstein & Hoover, supra note 82; Telephone Interview with Sondra Solovay, Weight
Discrimination Attorney, S.F. (Aug. 17, 2011).
294. Jason B. Johnson, supra note 83. The San Francisco Human Rights Ordinance had already
begun protecting against discrimination on the basis of race and sexual orientation in 1999. See Epstein
& Hoover, supranote 82.

295.

City and Cty. of S.F., Minutes, Meeting of the Human Rights Commission (June 10, 1999),

http://sf-

hrc.org/ftp/archive/sfarchive.org/index73dd.html?dept-1028&sub=2153&dtype=2156&year-2194&fil
e=12582.
296. S.F. Human Rights Comm'n, Resolution on Body Size Discrimination (June 10, 1999), in
2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office).
297. S.F., CAL., ADMINIsTRATIVE CODE § 12A.1 (LEXIS through Ordinance 13-11); City and
County of San Francisco, Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Supervisors (Mar. 20, 2000), in 2000
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board requested a report on the ordinance from the Finance and Labor
Committee as well as an opinion from the city attorney's office.
On May 3, 2000-almost a year after the 24 Hour Fitness protestlocal fat rights advocates finally got their long-awaited public hearing at the
Finance and Labor Committee meeting. Although the ordinance sponsor,
Supervisor Ammiano, was a "rail-thin" man, the rest of the fat rights
advocates testifying at the hearing were almost exclusively large women.298
The "true superstar" of the hearing, however, was Margarita Rossi, a
sixteen-year-old student at the San Francisco School of the Arts. 299 Rossi
recounted an emotional tale of being denied care for a gynecological
problem by a local nurse practitioner. The nurse practitioner was so busy
making "repeated remarks about [Rossi's] weight" that she "never got
around to conducting an exam." 300
Rossi's emotional testimony led to a unanimous approval of the
ordinance by the three Finance and Labor Committee members, and the
ordinance was scheduled for a vote in front of the full board on May 8,
2000. Without any debate, all eleven supervisors voted to pass the
ordinance after the first reading on May 8, 2000.301 This unanimous board
support continued with the vote for final passage on May 15, 2000.302 Less
than two weeks later, the ordinance became the official law of San
Francisco with the signature of Mayor Willie L. Brown on May 26,
2000.303
Over a year later, the Human Rights Commission issued compliance
guidelines for the ordinance, which carry the force of law in San Francisco.
The guidelines state that weight discrimination is more than just

Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office),
http://sfbos.org/ftp/meetingarchive/fullboardlindex.aspx-page=2657.html.
298. Epstein, supranote 83; City and County of San Francisco, Minutes, Meeting of the Boardof
Supervisors Finance and Labor Committee (May 3, 2000), 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on

file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office). Other speakers included Debby Burgard, a
local psychologist who ran a movement class for women over two hundred pounds; Carole Cullum, a
member of San Francisco's Board of Appeals, who testified about her personal experiences with the
lack of plus-size seating accommodations in San Francisco; and Marilyn Wann, the organizer of the 24

Hour Fitness protest that had initially piqued the Board's interest in weight discrimination back in
February 1999. Id.; see Epstein, supranote 83.

299. Telephone Interview with Sondra Solovay, supra note 135.
300. Epstein, supranote 83.
301. City and Cty. of S.F., Minutes, Meeting ofthe Boardof Supervisors (May 8, 2000), in 2000
Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office),
http://sfbos.org/ftp/meetingarchive/fullboard/index.aspx-page=2664.html.
302. City and Cty. of S.F., Minutes, Meeting of the Board of Supervisors (May 15, 2000), in
2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office),
http://sfbos.org/ftp/meetingarchive/fullboard/index.aspx-page=2665.html.

303. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 101-00 (May 26, 2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
S.F., CAL. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Chapters 12, 12A, 12B, 12C), in 2000 Human Rights Ordinance
Folder (on file with San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office).
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discrimination on the basis of "a numerical measurement of total body
weight." 304 Weight discrimination also includes discrimination on the basis
of "the ratio of a person's weight in relation to height," "an individual's
unique physical composition of weight through body size, shape, and
proportions," and "an impression of a person as fat or thin regardless of the
numerical measurement." 3 05
Under the ordinance, weight discrimination victims can pursue a
remedy through the Human Rights Commission and through a private
action simultaneously. 306 Victims who choose the private action route may
file their lawsuits directly-there is no exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement.307 Victims who choose the commission route must
first file a complaint. After the commission investigates the complaint, the
director issues a finding as to whether there is probable cause that
discrimination occurred. If the director fails to find probable cause, the
complainant may appeal the finding; otherwise, the commission closes the
case.308
If the director finds probable cause, however, the case proceeds to a
hearing in front of an appointed hearing officer (the officer cannot be a
member of the commission). The hearing is conducted like any other trial,
with both parties--complainant and respondent-responsible for
presenting their own evidence and putting on their own cases. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer has thirty days to issue
written findings of fact, a decision, and remedies (if applicable). 3 09 The
remedies available are among the most generous of all the local laws:
treble, special, and general damages; up to $400 in additional damages;
attorney fees; and even punitive damages. 310 Either party may appeal the
hearing officer's findings and request a new hearing in front of the full
eight-member Human Rights Commission.3 11 If the commission rejects the
appeal request, the parties must turn to the court system if they wish to
pursue the matter further.

304.

S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT WEIGHT AND

HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION

§ II.A

(2001), 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder (on file with San

Francisco, Cal., Human Rights Commission Office).
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306.

Id.
Note, however, the Human Rights Commission has discretion whether to hold the

Commission proceedings in abeyance until the lawsuit has concluded. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N,
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION COMPLAINTS, Rule III(B)(3)

(2002).
307. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE § 3307(c) (LEXIS through Ord. 59-11). Discrimination victims
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308. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 306, at Rules XIV-XV.
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Binghamton, New York

The final and most recent weight-discrimination law came from the
other side of the country in Binghamton, New York. The law was
Binghamton Councilman Sean G. Massey's "first major legislative
endeavor" after his election in 2008.3 12 Much like the earlier Urbana and
Santa Cruz ordinances, the Binghamton ordinance began as one principally
concerned with LGBT rights. In June of 2008, the Gender Equality NonDiscrimination Act, which would have prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, passed the New York State
Assembly.3 13 The New York State Senate, however, had a slight
Republican majority that narrowly defeated the bill.3 14 The defeat enraged
LGBT activists statewide. Soon afterwards, a group of transgendered
activists approached Councilmember Massey, who then brought the idea to
the rest of the Binghamton Council.
Fortunately for Massey, the composition of Binghamton politicians in
2008 was overwhelmingly liberal. Massey, his six fellow council members,
and the mayor were all Democrats. During the 2008 election, Massey and
the mayor had even been endorsed by the Working Families Party, a New
York-based, progressive grassroots organization that advocates equal rights
for all. 315 With the support of his fellow councilmembers, Massey began
the research necessary to draft the ordinance.
Interestingly, what distinguishes Binghamton from the two previous
LGBT laws in Urbana and Santa Cruz is the reason for including personal
appearance and weight in the Binghamton ordinance. In Urbana and Santa
Cruz, weight and personal appearance were added to distract council
members who were wary to pass a law that exclusively concerned LGBT
rights. In Binghamton, however, weight and personal appearance
protections were actually suggested by LGBT groups. According to
Massey:
Research on the legislation put me in contact with Lisa Mottet at
the National Lesbian and Gay Task Force. She helped me find
model legislation that included protections based on gender
expression and identity. But we both agreed, however, that since
we were creating a new law, we might as well create as
comprehensive [a] law as possible.316
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E-mail from Sean G. Massey, supra note 84.
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As a result, Massey contacted two San Francisco fat rights activists,
Sondra Solovay and Marilyn Wann, who had helped draft that city's
ordinance and compliance guidelines. With their help, Massey drafted an
ordinance that "protect[s] and safeguard[s] the right and opportunity of all
persons to be free from discrimination based on ... weight."3 17 Like the
San Francisco ordinance, the definition of weight is extremely broad,
including "an impression of a person as fat or thin regardless of the
numerical measurement" and "[a]n individual's body size, shape,
proportions, and composition ... [that] make[s] them appear fat or thin
regardless of numerical weight."31 8
The ordinance passed the Binghamton Council successfully on
December 15, 2008."' Unlike the other nine jurisdictions, Binghamton did
not initially have a commission that oversaw the administration of its
Human Rights Law, forcing early complainants to file a private lawsuit. In
late 2011, however, the Binghamton City Council established a new
Human Rights Commission, with the hopes of eventually creating an
alternative administrative procedure for discrimination victims to seek
relief.3 20 By 2014, all seven members of the new Commission had been
appointed, and the Commission had posted a discrimination complaint
intake form to its website. 32 1 Regardless of how future discrimination
complainants in Binghamton will choose to proceed-via commission
process or via private lawsuit-they can seek injunctive relief, equitable
relief, compensatory damages, and attorney fees.322
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321. Human Rights Comm'n, Binghamton Human Rights Commission Intake Form, CITY OF
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Appendix Table 1. Number of Observations in Ten Jurisdictions and
Their Surrounding Areas, by BMI Classification
Women
Men

Michigan
Bordering
States
D.C.
Bordering
States
Madison
Rest of
Wisconsin

Underweight
/ Normal
Weight
29,436

Overweight

20,862

Obese/
Morbidly
Obese
12,391

20,837

Obese/
Morbidly
Obese
18,832

55,888

32,247

77,848

53,148

46,513

Underweight
/ Normal
Weight
14,014

Overweight

37,981

10,514

9,264

3,499

17,064

9,130

7,612

23,359

35,381

18,369

54,027

33,594

26,562

658

854

311

1,174

601

411

10,010

15,618

8,570

19,895

13,321

10,804

176

208

116

350

202

153

12,375

16,779

8,162

26,449

15,790

12,009

150

176

140

274

232

166

14,774

18,461

8,735

30,396

17,491

12,333

Santa Cruz

138

173

75

291

144

114

Sancs
Francisco

690

562

190

1,077

391

235

Califor
California

22,848

28,775

13,175

44,804

25,038

18,098

Urbana
Rest of
Illinois
Binghamton
Rest of
Net ork
New York

Howard
656
846
406
1,405
678
437
County
Harford
465
759
436
1,085
684
504
County
Prince
2,251
2,057
2,602
1,047
1,972
1,354
George's
County
Rest of
10,012 30,699
30,699 19,100 14,893
MRstn
of10,012
Maryland
II
Notes: This table includes the number of respondents ages 18 to 65 in the 1985-2012 BRFSS data, by
jurisdiction and BMI classification. Santa Cruz observations are from only the 1993-2012 data, San
Francisco observations are from only the 2001-2012 data, and Binghamton observations are from only the
2009-2012 data. Sample excludes pregnant women.

